In the 1960s there was a paucity of empirical evidence on the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions. For example, Henry Manne (1965) discusses the various arguments for and against merger. At that time the debate centered on the extent to which mergers should be regulated in order to foster competition in the product markets. Manne argued that mergers represent a natural outcome in an efficiently operating market for corporate control and consequently provide protection for shareholders. He downplayed the importance of the argument that mergers reduce competition. At the conclusion of his article Manne suggested that the two competing hypotheses for mergers could be separated by studying the price effects of the involved corporations. He hypothesized that, if mergers created market power, one would observe price increases for both the target and acquirer. In contrast, if the merger represented the acquiring corporation paying for control of the target, one would observe a price increase for the target only and not for the acquirer. However, Manne concludes, in reference to the price effects of mergers, that “no data are presently available on this subject”