Additional key elements for success
• The terms and conditions of the Atlanta Agreement were intensely negotiated between the partners in Pakistan. Consequently, ownership of the agreement by the partners and stakeholders was never in doubt.
• The project gained significant momentum and profile as a result of the signing of the agreement, which set out a partnership approach, including defining the roles and functions of each partner. The partnership between industry and non-industry actors was pivotal to the project’s success and the leadership in industry was clear and decisive, although not all SCCI members were favourable to it.
• The project had time-bound targets for the elimination of child labour from the supply chain of participating manufacturers.
• The project received strong support from all the local stakeholders, including local communities.
• The project benefited from the vision of the local and international business leaders to accept responsibility for informal sector activities linked to soccer ball stitching. Tackling child labour at its source in informal supply chains was vital.
• The project was endorsed by the then All Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions (APFTU) and the Employers’ Federation of Pakistan and these organizations were also members of the project coordinating committee.
Sustainability
A new body, the Independent Monitoring Association for Child Labour (IMAC), was established in 2003 to take over and sustain the industry monitoring system begun under the ILO project. Participating companies are required to implement their own internal monitoring systems, in addition to external IMAC monitoring. Balls stitched in IMAC-registered centres are stamped with special codes. A daily random list of workplaces to be inspected by IMAC monitors is generated by computer software. Inspections cover a range of workplace elements, including but not exclusively the presence of child labourers. In order to persuade the manufacturers to strictly adhere to the provisions of the program, IMAC provides incentives by categorizing the level of compliance and cooperation according to three tiers. After three months on the lowest tier, indicating no measures taken to improve compliance, the company is removed from the program. The system is self-financing and no longer dependent on external support.
An interesting general outcome has been a significant increase in awareness of child labour among communities within Sialkot district and particularly at district government and private sector levels.
Additional key elements for success
• The terms and conditions of the Atlanta Agreement were intensely negotiated between the partners in Pakistan. Consequently, ownership of the agreement by the partners and stakeholders was never in doubt.
• The project gained significant momentum and profile as a result of the signing of the agreement, which set out a partnership approach, including defining the roles and functions of each partner. The partnership between industry and non-industry actors was pivotal to the project’s success and the leadership in industry was clear and decisive, although not all SCCI members were favourable to it.
• The project had time-bound targets for the elimination of child labour from the supply chain of participating manufacturers.
• The project received strong support from all the local stakeholders, including local communities.
• The project benefited from the vision of the local and international business leaders to accept responsibility for informal sector activities linked to soccer ball stitching. Tackling child labour at its source in informal supply chains was vital.
• The project was endorsed by the then All Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions (APFTU) and the Employers’ Federation of Pakistan and these organizations were also members of the project coordinating committee.
Sustainability
A new body, the Independent Monitoring Association for Child Labour (IMAC), was established in 2003 to take over and sustain the industry monitoring system begun under the ILO project. Participating companies are required to implement their own internal monitoring systems, in addition to external IMAC monitoring. Balls stitched in IMAC-registered centres are stamped with special codes. A daily random list of workplaces to be inspected by IMAC monitors is generated by computer software. Inspections cover a range of workplace elements, including but not exclusively the presence of child labourers. In order to persuade the manufacturers to strictly adhere to the provisions of the program, IMAC provides incentives by categorizing the level of compliance and cooperation according to three tiers. After three months on the lowest tier, indicating no measures taken to improve compliance, the company is removed from the program. The system is self-financing and no longer dependent on external support.
An interesting general outcome has been a significant increase in awareness of child labour among communities within Sialkot district and particularly at district government and private sector levels.
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