The incompleteness of Weberian definitions of the state is only part of my objection to them. The second concern is about understanding coercion or force to be part of the concept of the state. One might have thought , to the contrary, that state without coercion and force cannot be conceptually connected. Consider a ‘state’ without law, or one whose jurisdiction was not territorial. We would not consider it to be a genuine state. Law and territoriality are essential properties of states, part of the concept of state. Contrast these properties with coercion or force. We can conceive of a state which does not employ coercion or force. Imagine a state that is legitimate; its basis structure and its law are just, and those subject to its laws are obligated to obey them. Suppose that the letter are always motivated to comply with just laws; they do not, for instance, suffer from any weakness of the will or any other problem which might lead them to fail to do what they ought to do. Then, coercion and force would not be needed to enforce the law. This possibility, admittedly fantastic and utopian, seems perfectly coherent. There is nothing in the nature of a law which requires that compliance be assured coercively. It does not seem to be, then, a conceptual truth that states are coercive.