Boundary conditions act No one will deny that we are in the midst of a remarkable mo transformation. A period of long prosperity caused us to tolerate: globalization by an entrepreneurial spirit on overdrive, while losing the necessary risk focus, (2) over did expansion of global credit (which has created unjustified str leverages and weakened firm's endurance to turbulence); str (3) new forms of financial instruments (which cascaded and so dispersed risk far from the source to distant geographies connectedness and link- w and enterprises); (4) international ages (that leveraged economic epidemics); and (5) interna tional market expansion, accelerated by the above forces, 2 along with managerial greed. x Against this, current theories maintain that co evolution of organizations (e.g., MNEs) and institutions arrangements are ope is viable because institutional albeit unpredictable. For instance, North and Wallis (1994) point to the distinction between social technologies and physical technologies. The difference between the two lies, according to the authors, is that, while one evolves in patterned human interaction, the other is engineered. Certain aspects of social technologies happen to yield only particular standardized and legitimized rules, but not others. This is because of the potential availability of many alternative institutional arrangements at any given point in time (North 2005). Accordingly, the evolution takes place as institutions (and their enforcement mecha nisms) set the rules of the game, which organizations, in pursuit of their own learning and resource allocative goals, must follow.