But let us start at the beginning. Shortly after the adoption of inflation targeting, my predecessor but one,
Lord Kingsdown (Robin Leigh-Pemberton as he then was), gave an important speech at the London School
of Economics – indeed in this room – entitled “The Case for Price Stability”.3
I remember it vividly – for I had
been involved in drafting it. It was an exciting time; we were reconstructing British monetary policy after the
trauma of forced exit from the ERM. In those days, of course, the Chancellor set monetary policy and the
Bank of England played only a behind the scenes role. But the role of the Bank was about to change – first
with the Inflation Report in February 1993, which gave the Bank its own public voice, and then with
independence for the Bank and the creation of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in 1997.
The inflation target was born out of the experience that high and variable inflation was very costly to reduce
and that only a policy based on domestic considerations would be credible. The objective of monetary policy
in the medium term would unambiguously be price stability. As the then Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Norman Lamont, put it “we wish to reduce inflation to the point where expected changes in the average price
level are small enough and gradual enough that they do not materially affect business and household
financial plans”. The idea that there is a long-run trade-off between price stability and employment had long
since been abandoned. That intellectual revolution, associated with the names of Friedman, Phelps and
Lucas, had stood the test of time and formed the foundations of inflation targeting.
The initial reception of the inflation target among economists and commentators alike was distinctly mixed.
As the Financial Times put it in a leader published twenty years ago today, “the Chancellor's speech was as economically thin as it was politically disappointing”. The critics argued that the new framework was
inadequate to control inflation. They were to be proved wrong. Over the previous twenty years inflation had
been the single biggest problem facing the UK economy, peaking at 27% a year in 1975. Over the
subsequent twenty years, inflation, as I mentioned earlier, would average only 2.1%.
From the outset, inflation targeting was conceived as a means by which central banks could improve the
credibility and predictability of monetary policy. The overriding concern was not to eliminate fluctuations in
consumer price inflation from year to year, but to reduce the degree of uncertainty over the price level in the
long run because it is from that unpredictability that the real costs of inflation stem.
The improvement in credibility of policy is shown by the fact that whereas in 1992 expected inflation, as
measured by the difference between yields on conventional and index-linked gilts, was close to 6%, today
the same measure is around 2½ %.
Predictability of the price level is greater because over a long period inflation has on average been close to
the target.4
Even if inflation deviates from target – as will often be the case – it is expected to return to
target, and so inflation expectations are anchored.5
That is why since 2007 the UK has been able to absorb
the largest depreciation of sterling since the Second World War, as well as very large rises in oil and
commodity prices, with an increase in inflation to an average of only 3.2% over the past five years and
without dislodging long-term inflation expectations. So the framework has been tested and has proved its
worth.
But the current crisis has demonstrated vividly that price stability is not sufficient for economic stability more
generally. Low and stable inflation did not prevent a banking crisis. Did the single-minded pursuit of
consumer price stability allow a disaster to unfold? Would it have been better to accept sustained periods of
below or above target inflation in order to prevent the build up of imbalances in the financial system? Is
there, in other words, sometimes a trade-off between price stability and financial stability?
But let us start at the beginning. Shortly after the adoption of inflation targeting, my predecessor but one,
Lord Kingsdown (Robin Leigh-Pemberton as he then was), gave an important speech at the London School
of Economics – indeed in this room – entitled “The Case for Price Stability”.3
I remember it vividly – for I had
been involved in drafting it. It was an exciting time; we were reconstructing British monetary policy after the
trauma of forced exit from the ERM. In those days, of course, the Chancellor set monetary policy and the
Bank of England played only a behind the scenes role. But the role of the Bank was about to change – first
with the Inflation Report in February 1993, which gave the Bank its own public voice, and then with
independence for the Bank and the creation of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in 1997.
The inflation target was born out of the experience that high and variable inflation was very costly to reduce
and that only a policy based on domestic considerations would be credible. The objective of monetary policy
in the medium term would unambiguously be price stability. As the then Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Norman Lamont, put it “we wish to reduce inflation to the point where expected changes in the average price
level are small enough and gradual enough that they do not materially affect business and household
financial plans”. The idea that there is a long-run trade-off between price stability and employment had long
since been abandoned. That intellectual revolution, associated with the names of Friedman, Phelps and
Lucas, had stood the test of time and formed the foundations of inflation targeting.
The initial reception of the inflation target among economists and commentators alike was distinctly mixed.
As the Financial Times put it in a leader published twenty years ago today, “the Chancellor's speech was as economically thin as it was politically disappointing”. The critics argued that the new framework was
inadequate to control inflation. They were to be proved wrong. Over the previous twenty years inflation had
been the single biggest problem facing the UK economy, peaking at 27% a year in 1975. Over the
subsequent twenty years, inflation, as I mentioned earlier, would average only 2.1%.
From the outset, inflation targeting was conceived as a means by which central banks could improve the
credibility and predictability of monetary policy. The overriding concern was not to eliminate fluctuations in
consumer price inflation from year to year, but to reduce the degree of uncertainty over the price level in the
long run because it is from that unpredictability that the real costs of inflation stem.
The improvement in credibility of policy is shown by the fact that whereas in 1992 expected inflation, as
measured by the difference between yields on conventional and index-linked gilts, was close to 6%, today
the same measure is around 2½ %.
Predictability of the price level is greater because over a long period inflation has on average been close to
the target.4
Even if inflation deviates from target – as will often be the case – it is expected to return to
target, and so inflation expectations are anchored.5
That is why since 2007 the UK has been able to absorb
the largest depreciation of sterling since the Second World War, as well as very large rises in oil and
commodity prices, with an increase in inflation to an average of only 3.2% over the past five years and
without dislodging long-term inflation expectations. So the framework has been tested and has proved its
worth.
But the current crisis has demonstrated vividly that price stability is not sufficient for economic stability more
generally. Low and stable inflation did not prevent a banking crisis. Did the single-minded pursuit of
consumer price stability allow a disaster to unfold? Would it have been better to accept sustained periods of
below or above target inflation in order to prevent the build up of imbalances in the financial system? Is
there, in other words, sometimes a trade-off between price stability and financial stability?
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