tive view, cannot, for instance, allow that one of the goals of
legislation should be to make people virtuous in one or another
meaning of that term, is that this would involve a violation
of its procedural norm. For, given the diversity of
modern societies, it would unfailingly be the case that some
people and not others would be commited to the favored
conception of virtue. They might be in a majority; indeed, it
is very likely that they would be, for otherwise a democratic
society probably would not espouse their view. Nevertheless,
this view would not be everyone’s view, and in espousing
this substantive outlook the society would not be treating
the dissident minority with equal respect. It would be saying
to them, in effect, “your view is not as valuable, in the eyes
of this polity, as that of your more numerous compatriots.”
There are very profound philosophical assumptions underlying
this view of liberalism, which is rooted in the
thought of Immanuel Kant. Among other features, this view
understands human dignity to consist largely in autonomy,
that is, in the ability of each person to determine for himself
or herself a view of the good life. Dignity is associated less
with any particular understanding of the good life, such that
someone’s departure from this would detract from his or her
own dignity, than with the power to consider and espouse
for oneself some view or other. We are not respecting this
power equally in all subjects, it is claimed, if we raise the outcome
of some people’s deliberations officially over that of
others. A liberal society must remain neutral on the good
life, and restrict itself to ensuring that however they see
things, citizens deal fairly with each other and the state deals
equally with all.
The popularity of this view of the human agent as primarily
a subject of self-determining or self-expressive choice
helps to explain why this model of liberalism is so strong.
But we must also consider that it has been urged with great
force and intelligence by liberal thinkers in the United States,
tive view, cannot, for instance, allow that one of the goals oflegislation should be to make people virtuous in one or anothermeaning of that term, is that this would involve a violationof its procedural norm. For, given the diversity ofmodern societies, it would unfailingly be the case that somepeople and not others would be commited to the favoredconception of virtue. They might be in a majority; indeed, itis very likely that they would be, for otherwise a democraticsociety probably would not espouse their view. Nevertheless,this view would not be everyone’s view, and in espousingthis substantive outlook the society would not be treatingthe dissident minority with equal respect. It would be sayingto them, in effect, “your view is not as valuable, in the eyesof this polity, as that of your more numerous compatriots.”There are very profound philosophical assumptions underlyingthis view of liberalism, which is rooted in thethought of Immanuel Kant. Among other features, this viewunderstands human dignity to consist largely in autonomy,that is, in the ability of each person to determine for himselfor herself a view of the good life. Dignity is associated lesswith any particular understanding of the good life, such thatsomeone’s departure from this would detract from his or herown dignity, than with the power to consider and espousefor oneself some view or other. We are not respecting thispower equally in all subjects, it is claimed, if we raise the outcome
of some people’s deliberations officially over that of
others. A liberal society must remain neutral on the good
life, and restrict itself to ensuring that however they see
things, citizens deal fairly with each other and the state deals
equally with all.
The popularity of this view of the human agent as primarily
a subject of self-determining or self-expressive choice
helps to explain why this model of liberalism is so strong.
But we must also consider that it has been urged with great
force and intelligence by liberal thinkers in the United States,
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..