U Zaw Aye Maung’s statement is telling because it illustrated a conception of victim and violator that is
diametrically opposed to the one made visible in international discourse. There are, of course, many
conceptions of religious conflict in Myanmar,10 but while U Zaw Aye Maung’s statement appears
extreme in comparison to international discourses, in the domestic context this is not the case.11 ‘Fear is
not just on the side of the Muslims, but on the side of the Buddhists as well,’ Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
explained to the BBC in October 2013. ‘There’s a perception that Muslim power, global Muslim power,
is very great.’
12 These perceptions are reflected in the rhetoric of public figures and Buddhist leaders from
groups including the ‘969 movement’ and Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion
(colloquially known by its Burmese acronym ‘Ma Ba Tha’). These groups have risen to prominence
within the last three years as they have mobilized to project an existential threat, in which Buddhism is
vulnerable and needing protection lest it be supplanted by Islam as the majority religion in Myanmar.13
Internationally, the most extreme examples of their speech have attracted media attention, including
references to Muslims as ‘rabid dogs’ and invasive species.14 Domestically, they have established
themselves as forces with clear and powerful social and political influence.15
Yet, these narratives of threat and self-defence are emergent works in progress, as are the groups seeking
to produce them. The widespread popularity of groups like 969 and Ma Ba Tha may be inferred from