These provisions are firmly tied to an important cluster of preambular ideas: namely, that each and every human being has inherent dignity; that it is this inherent dignity that grounds (or accounts for) the possession of human rights (it is from such inherent dignity that such rights are derived); that these are inalienable rights; and that, because all human have dignity, that hold these rights equally. So understood, human dignity is the rock on which the superstructure of human rights is built. The logic of this conception of human dignity as the ground of human rights, however, is that the primary practical and political discourse is that of human rights rather than that of human dignity. In other words, while philosophers might recur to the idea of human dignity as the deeper justification for human rights, the practical business of pressing one’s interests against others (particularly against powerful States) will be conducted in terms of claimed human rights. On this analysis, it is perfectly clear why human dignity, having done its work in grounding human rights, then slips into background (see e.g. Kolnai 1976: 257-9; Goodin 1981: 91-100).