conclusions and insights which have emerged.
We began our enterprise by considering how we could distinguish
between different approaches to the study of
organisations. The view that 'all theories of organisation are based
upon a philosophy of science and a theory of society' seemed to
recur time and again in our conversations and we soon found it
defining two major dimensions of analysis. Although organisation
theorists are not always very explicit about the basic assumptions
which inform their point of view, it is clear that they all take a stand
on each of these issues. Whetller they are aware of it or not, they
bring to their subject of study a frame of reference which reflects a
whole series of assumptions about the nature of the social world
and the way in which it might be investigated.
Our attempt to explore these assumptions led us into the realm
of social philosoph y. We were confranted wi th problems of ontology
and epistemology and other issues which rarely receive consideration
within the field of organisation studies. As we
investigated these issues we found that they underpinned the great
philosophical debates between social theorists from rival
intellectual traditions. We realised that the orthodoxy in our subject
was based in essence uponjust one of these traditions, and that
the satellite perspectives which we had observed as surrounding
the orthodoxy were, in fact, derived from quite a separate
intellectual source. We realised that they were attempting to
articulate points of view which derived from diametrically
opposed assumptions about the basic nature of the social world;
accordingly they subscribed to quite different assumptions about
the very nature of the social-scientific enterprise itself.
In investigating assumptions with regard to the nature ofsociety
we were, at first, able to operate on firmer ground. The sociology
of the 1960s had focused upon the 'order-conflict debate' -
whether sociology emphasises the 'problem of order' or the
'problem of conflict and change'. By the late 1960s the debate had
been pronounced dead, and these two views of society were seen
merely as two aspects of the same problematic. In reviewing the
literature relevant to this debate we became increasingly convinced
that it had met a premature death. Whilst it was clear that
academic sociologists had convinced themselves that the 'problem
of conflict' could be subsumed under the 'problem of order',
theorists outside this tradition, particularly those interested in
Marxist theory, were actively engaged in the development of
social theories which placed the problems of conflict and change at
the forefront of their analysis. Although academic sociologists and
Introduction xi
Marxist social theorists appeared content to work in isolation,
ignoring the contradictory persp.ectives w~lich they. presented, it
seemed that any adequate analySIS of theones ofsociety must take
these rival perspectives into account. . Our journey into Marxist literature took us mto yet another new
realm as far as our initial interests were concerned. We were
surprised to find striking parallels betwe.en i~tellectual
developments within Mandsttheory and academiC soc~olog~. We
found that the assumptions about the nature of SOCial sCience
which had divided academic sociologists into different schools of
thought also divided Mantist theorists. In that realm, too, t~e
dominant theoretical framework was surrounded by satellite
schools of thought offering rival explanations. Pursuing thes~ traditions
to their source, we found that they emerged from prec~sely
the same bounds of social philosophy which had underWritten
divergent elements within sociology itself. It became clear that the
rival traditions emphasising 'order' as opposed to 'conflict' shared
the same pedigree as far as their roots in social philosophy were
concerned. Deriving from similar assumptions about the
ontological and epistemological status of social science, they h.ad
been wedded to fundamentally different frames of reference With
regard to the nature of society. ., .. Given these cross linkages between nvalmtellectual traditions,
it became clear to us that our two sets of assumptions could be
counter-posed to produce an analytical sch~me for studying soci~1
theories in general: the two sets of assu.mpllons de~ned fo~r baSIC
paradigms reflecting quite separate vlew.s of .soclal. reahty. On
attempting to relate this scheme to the SOCial sCience hteratu~e :ve
found that we possessed an eKtremely powerful tool.for negottatmg
our way through different subject areas, and one which made sense
of a great deal of the confusion which characterises much contemporary
debate within the social scienc.es. Th~ schem~ offered
itself as a form of intellectual map upon which SOCial theones could
be located according to their source and tradition. Theories rarely
if ever appear out of thin air; they usually have a well established
history behind them. We found that our i~tellectual map al