4. Competitive edge with respect to redistributions
of surpluses through central (or in the
United States, state) governments is still of tremendous
importance since it is somewhat of a
myth that central governments do not redistribute
to the degree they used to do. The channels
have shifted so that in both Britain (take
the case of Bristol) and in the United States (take
the case of Long Beach-San Diego) it is military
and defense contracts that provide the
sustenance for urban prosperity, in part because
of the sheer amount of money involved
but also because of the type of employment and
the spin-offs it may have into so-called "hightech"
industries (Markusen, 1986). And even
though every effort may have been made to cut
the flow of central government support to many
urban regions, there are many sectors of the
economy (health and education. for example)
and even whole metropolitan economies (see
Smith and Keller's 1983, study of New Orleans)
where such a cut off was simply impossible. Urban
ruling class alliances have had plenty of
opportunity, therefore, to exploit redistributive
mechanisms as a means to urban survival.
These four strategies are not mutually exclusive
and the uneven fortunes of metropolitan regions
have depended upon the nature of the coalitions
that have formed, the mix and timing of entrepreneurial
strategies, the particular resources (natural,
human, locational) with which the metropolitan
region can work, and the strength of the competition.
But uneven growth has also resulted from
the synergism that leads one kind of strategy to be
facilitative for another. For example, the growth
of the Los Angeles-San Diego-Long Beach-
Orange County megalopolis appears to have been
fuelled by interaction effects between strong governmental
redistributions to the defense industries