An estimated 500,000-800,000 people were killed in Rwanda in 1994. The lack of international response was compelling and the Secretary-General of the United Nations blamed the international community for its inaction. However, the UN Secretariat had received advance information about plans for mass murder in Rwanda. Critics blamed the Secretariat for ineffectiveness and for having misread the situation while others emphasized the need for the strengthening of early warning capacity. This article presents a different conclusion, namely that the handling of the Rwanda crisis was a political decision taken by top Secretariat officials, rather than an intelligence failure or the result of bureaucratic inertia. The argument is, that the problem was the unwillingness of senior officials to use the information at hand to provide the necessary political leadership for an indecisive international community.
An estimated 500,000-800,000 people were killed in Rwanda in 1994. The lack of international response was compelling and the Secretary-General of the United Nations blamed the international community for its inaction. However, the UN Secretariat had received advance information about plans for mass murder in Rwanda. Critics blamed the Secretariat for ineffectiveness and for having misread the situation while others emphasized the need for the strengthening of early warning capacity. This article presents a different conclusion, namely that the handling of the Rwanda crisis was a political decision taken by top Secretariat officials, rather than an intelligence failure or the result of bureaucratic inertia. The argument is, that the problem was the unwillingness of senior officials to use the information at hand to provide the necessary political leadership for an indecisive international community.
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