We study how agency problems affect the propensity to stockpile cash in the US. To measure agency
problems, we use multiple governance measures, which encompass ownership concentration (managerial
ownership and institutional holdings), executive compensation, board composition, and an index (and
subsets) of shareholder rights developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), referred to hereafter as the
GIndex. Since these measures may substitute for each other in controlling the firm’s agency problems, using
multiple measures provides a more complete picture and allows us to measure their differential impact on cash
holdings. In doing so, we provide evidence on the following three main questions: (i) Do higher agency
conflicts, as indicated by a weak governance structure, lead managers to stockpile cash reserves in the US?,
(ii) How do weak governance structures change the way cash stockpiles are deployed by managers?, and
(iii) Are the differences in the deployment of cash reflected in differences in firm profitability and ultimately
valuation?