‘‘prices start to rise a few sessions before cash
dividend payments; and on the ex-dividend day; they fall less than do dividend payments; finally decreasing in
the sessions following the payment; trading volume shows a considerable upward shift before the payment date;
is stable after, therefore, cash dividends influence prices and trading volumes in different ways before, at, and
after payment, providing some profitable active trading strategy opportunities around the ex-dividend day’’.
Gillet, Lapointe and Raimbourg (2008) claimed that the signalling equilibrium becomes unbalanced, originating
any dividend signalling policy to become difficult to implement. Dhanani (2005) argued that the research
results sustain dividend proposition related to signalling and ownership structure, in liking to those about capital
structure and investment decisions and agency issues. Moreover, he revealed significant differentiations
between managers’ responses, based on company size, industry sector, growth opportunities, ownership
structure, and information asymmetry.