I have tried to argue in an earlier work, Inequality
Reexamined, that a theory of justice in the
contemporary world could not have any serious
plausibility if it did not value equality in some
space – a space that would be seen as important in
that theory [1]. An income egalitarian, a champion
of democracy, a libertarian and a property-right
conservative may have different priorities, but each
wants equality of something that is seen as
valuable – indeed central – in the respective
political philosophy. The income egalitarian will
prize an equal distribution of incomes; the
committed democrat must insist on equal political
rights of all; the resolute libertarian has to demand
equal liberty; and the property-right conservative
must insist on the same right of all to use whatever
property each has. They all treasure – and not just
by accident – equality in terms of some variable
which is given a central position in their respective
theories of justice. Indeed, even an aggregative
focus, as Benthamite utilitarianism has, involves a
connection with equality in so far as everyone
Copyright # 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
would have to be treated in the same way in
arriving at simple aggregates (such as the utility
total).