Rivalry, Nonexcludability, Congested: Open Access and Common Property Resources (Users own the good in common; consumers respond to marginal private costs rather than marginal social cost; inefficient overconsumption, underinvestment in preserving the stock of goods; what’s not consumed by one will be consumed by another, i.e. forest used for firewood)
In summary, the efficiency implications of the various types of market failures involving public goods are as follows: In toll good situations (nonrivalry/excludability), underconsumption arises from economically inefficient pricing rather than a lack of supply; this problem is exacerbated by congestion which results in the need for variable pricing to achieve efficiency. In the case of pure and ambient goods (nonrivalry/nonexcludibility), the pervasiveness of free riding leads to no market supply at all. Finally in the case of open access resources (rivalry/nonexcludability), inefficiency results because individuals do not equate marginal social costs with marginal benefits but, rather, marginal private costs with marginal benefits. Hence, they inefficiently overconsume and inefficiently under-invest in enhancing open access resources.