If the stewardship theory of CEO governance is corroborated by future research, then the implications for business practice are considerable. In the U.S.A. most large firms presently break the rule about independent board chairs, by having a chair who is also the CEO. The implications of stewardship theory is that breaking the rule does not in fact produce the adverse consequences feared for corporate performance and returns to shareholders and is actually beneficial. Therefore the majority of large U.S. firms have already adopted the better-suited CEO governance structure and there is no need for them to change, despite strident calls for board reform (Kesner and Dalton 1986). The need, rather, is to bring academic theory and social commentary into line with present best practice as it has evolved in the U.S. business community. Moreover, should corporations bow to pressures to appoint independent board chairs the performance of the corporations and the returns to their shareholders would suffer.