Given these issues, it is understandable that researchers interested in the role of
awareness in L2 learning have ignored noticing and focused instead on the role of
awareness at the level of understanding. But this leaves open the question as to whether
the noticing account is testable. Is it possible to operationalize noticing in a way that
in principle separates noticing from understanding such that unambiguous evidence for
its role in learning can be established? Truscott and Sharwood Smith suggest that it is
not, that the distinction between noticing and understanding is "probably impossible
to operationalize in any nonarbitrary way" (Truscott & Sharwood Smith, 2011, p. 37).
Likewise, as discussed above, setting the lower bound of noticing seems equally arbitrary.
For example, Leow (1997) operationally defined noticing as "some form of subjective
awareness of new targeted linguistic forms in L2 data as revealed in learners' think
aloud protocols" [emphasis added] (p. 474). While we laud this attempt at operationally
defining this elusive construct, we feel that any such operational definitions necessarily
depend on 1) how articulate the learner is, 2) the researcher's interpretation of the
learner's verbalization, and 3) where the researcher decides the lower bound is. Thus,
operationally defining noticing and distinguishing it from understanding become
inherently subjective and noisy. ฉันรักแปล