the criteria of recognition nor those of evaluation are necessary and sufficient to define a work of Art. Weitz’s point is therefore clear: Art cannot be defined as it is an open concept and any definition would be limitative and prescriptive in a way that would lead us away from its very nature. One of the most known criticisms to Weitz theory came from Maurice Mandelbaum who, in his piece ‘Family Resemblances and Generalization concerning the Arts’, commented that the definition of a theory of Art does not necessarily act as a prescription of its character. Mandelbaum argued that the theory proposed by Wittgenstein on the concept of games is flawed as although games do not always share resemblance to each other, they do have other properties in common. These properties constitute the essence of the concept of game, just like the property of common genetic origin is shared by members of one family notwithstanding the many attributes which differentiate them from each other. In this text I will argue that Weitz is wrong in claiming that Art cannot be defined, and Mandelbaum succeeds in his critical analysis, although Weitz has some strong points in the objections he raises against other theories and in terms of what he is outlines as the challenges in Aesthetics. I will then conclude stating that a theory of Art is possible but not necessarily within the terms accepted by analytical philosophy. Let’s examine Weitz’s argument first. Weitz claims that: firstly all theories of Art fail in their objective, secondly that Art is a concept and not a measurable entity, thirdly that Art cannot be defined as a definition is logically impossible, and lastly that none of the criteria used to recognise or evaluate works of art constitute necessary and sufficient properties. Firstly then, do all theories of Art fail in their objective to define the subject? It seems so, every theory has its critics and the debate over the definition of Art seems to be renewing regularly as the flaws in each of the theories are highlighted by rival or alternative points of view. Undoubtedly Weitz has a point here and he makes it correctly.
Secondly, is Art a concept and not a measurable entity as Weitz argues? Arguably so. Art is not mathematically definable, it exists empirically but is a very subjective topic. Paraphrasing Benedict Anderson’s definition of nations (
Imagined Communities, New York, 2006
), we could say that ‘Art is an imagined concept and the Art world is an imagined world’. Art does not exist in the real world as subject matter, it is a concept privately defined in each individual’s intellect and believed by each individual to be shared by others in society. What exists is a collection of individually owned concepts which support each other by means of communication in society. This is true for Art as for all abstract concepts dealt with by the human intellect. Thirdly, is a definition of Art logically impossible? Weitz argues that the extensibility of the concept of Art and its changeability over time make it impossible to define. It is difficult to agree with Weitz on this point. It is like saying that Art cannot be defined
by definitio
n. But isn’t that an implicit acceptance of a definition in itself? The mere fact that the concepts of Art is changeable over time should not prevent us from defining it, as changeability and extensibility can be built into a definition. Mandelbaum’s critique appears to be right here, but I will deal with this topic more deeply in the conclusion, when discussing the limits of analytical philosophy. Lastly, Weitz claims that the criteria of recognition and those of evaluation are neither sufficient nor necessary to define a work of art. I will focus on the criteria of recognition, as the criteria of evaluation appear just dispensatory of honorific value and parasitic of inherent criteria of recognition. Obviously there is a complex challenge here, that is to define what the actual criteria of recognition are. Once identified these should be considered at least sufficient if not necessary to the definition of a work of art. We could go along with Weitz’s example that if a piece of driftwood is to be considered
‘a lovely piece of sculpture’
this does not tell us that a different object bearing no resemblance nor properties similar to the driftwood cannot be defined as an artefact too. We could then say that we have identified two sets of seemingly different criteria which bear no apparent relation to each other but that taken on their own are individually sufficient to define a work of art. Our challenge would then be to discover whether these two criteria or sets of criteria really have nothing in common with each other or they effectively share some properties. Obviously resemblance or
external properties of the objects would no longer apply here: the objects themselves have no ‘Art’ properties of their own. It is in the complexity of human intellect and human sensitivity and their interaction with the supposed works of art that we have to look for those commonalities that would allow us to put in the same category (and therefore elect to status of works of art) Leonardo’s
Mona Lisa
, Duchamps’
Fountain
and Andy Warhol’s
Empire
. Should we find these commonalities then we would have proven Weitz wrong as these properties would be both sufficient and necessary. Should we not, should we find that there is actually nothing in common between the works of art in question and nothing in common in how we react to them, then we would have proven that Art can be loosely defined by pointing to sets of sufficient properties, none of them necessary, only partially defeating Weitz’s argument. It is tempting to now drill down into the topic and start stating here what the criteria of recognition should be. This however would lead us to add one more theory of Art to the already conspicuous number of theories out there, with dubious results and quickly leading us outside the scope of this essay. Standing therefore within the realm of logical reasoning, we can confidently say that Art being a subjective topic, it is possible to speculate on its definition but it is wrong to claim the authority on the specification of its criteria. To summarise the above points therefore, Weitz misses the point by saying that Art cannot be defined because of its non-essentialism, whilst he may or may not be completely right when he says that criteria of recognition are not sufficient and necessary to define a work of art. Weitz is right though when he says that all known theories fail to capture the essence of Art. This is clearly one of the limitations of analytical philosophy which, with the practice of rationally and sistematically dissecting a topic, relying on necessary and sufficient properties to capture its potentially complex nature in a single definition, fails when it has to deal with complex intellectual concepts. Art, Nation and Love among many others, figure among these complex concepts. They are coined and owned by the human intellect and find no empirical confirmation in the real world. This empirical element is functional to stabilising the meaning of terms and allowing a definition which can be shared by all users of a language.
As Weitz rightly says, the understanding of the concept of Art changes over time. What Weitz fails to mention is that its definition also differs from individual to individual, and this results in an infinite number of possible definitions. This fact should not prevent us from defining Art though. Man has developed complex languages to be able to express complex thoughts, and for as long as we accept the possible looseness and the temporary and subjective limitations of a definition, then a definition of Art is certainly possible
เงื่อนไขของการรับรู้หรือของการประเมินมีความจำเป็น และเพียงพอเพื่อกำหนดงานศิลปะ จุดของไวทซ์จึงชัดเจน: ศิลปะจะเป็นแนวคิดการเปิด และคำจำกัดความใด ๆ จะเหมาะกับที่จะนำเราจากลักษณะมาก และ limitative วิจารณ์มากที่สุดรู้จักกับไวทซ์ทฤษฎีอย่างใดอย่างหนึ่งมาจากมอริ Mandelbaum ที่ ในชิ้นของเขา 'Resemblances ครอบครัวและ Generalization เกี่ยวกับศิลปะ' ความเห็นว่า นิยามของทฤษฎีศิลปะไม่จำเป็นต้องทำหน้าที่เป็นยาของอักขระตัว Mandelbaum โต้เถียงว่า ทฤษฎีที่เสนอ โดย Wittgenstein บนแนวคิดของเกม flawed เป็นแม้ว่าเกมไม่มีแชร์รูปกันเสมอ มีคุณสมบัติอื่น ๆ ที่เหมือนกัน คุณสมบัติเหล่านี้เป็นสาระสำคัญของแนวคิดของเกม เหมือนคุณสมบัติของแหล่งกำเนิดพันธุกรรมทั่วไปถูกใช้ร่วมกัน โดยสมาชิกของครอบครัวอย่างไรก็ตามแอตทริบิวต์จำนวนมากซึ่งแตกออกจากกัน ในข้อนี้จะโต้เถียงว่า ไวทซ์ในอ้างว่า ไม่สามารถกำหนดศิลปะ และ Mandelbaum สำเร็จในการวิเคราะห์ของเขาสำคัญผิด แต่ไวทซ์มีบางจุดแข็งอุปสรรคเขายก กับทฤษฎีอื่น ๆ และในแง่ของ สิ่งที่เขาจะสรุปเป็นความท้าทายในความสวยงาม แล้วผมจะสรุประบุว่า ทฤษฎีศิลปะได้ แต่ไม่จำเป็นต้องอยู่ภายในเงื่อนไขยอมรับ โดยปรัชญาวิเคราะห์ ลองตรวจสอบของไวทซ์อาร์กิวเมนต์แรก ไวทซ์อ้างที่: ประการแรกทฤษฎีของศิลปะทั้งหมดล้มเหลวในวัตถุประสงค์ของพวกเขา ประการที่สอง ศิลปะที่เป็นแนวคิดและไม่มีเอนทิตีที่วัด ประการ งานศิลปะที่ไม่สามารถกำหนดเป็นคำนิยามไม่เหตุผล และสุดท้าย ที่ไม่มีเกณฑ์ที่ใช้ในการรู้ หรือประเมินผลงานศิลปะเป็นคุณสมบัติที่จำเป็น และเพียงพอ ประการแรก แล้ว ทำทฤษฎีของศิลปะทั้งหมดล้มเหลวในวัตถุประสงค์ของการกำหนดชื่อเรื่องหรือไม่ เหมือนดัง ทุกทฤษฎีมีการวิจารณ์ และการอภิปรายมากกว่าคำนิยามของศิลปะน่า จะเป็นการสานต่ออย่างสม่ำเสมอเป็นข้อบกพร่องในแต่ละทฤษฎีจะเน้นดูของจุดอื่น หรือคู่แข่ง ไม่ต้องสงสัยไวทซ์มีจุดที่นี่ และเขาทำได้อย่างถูกต้อง Secondly, is Art a concept and not a measurable entity as Weitz argues? Arguably so. Art is not mathematically definable, it exists empirically but is a very subjective topic. Paraphrasing Benedict Anderson’s definition of nations ( Imagined Communities, New York, 2006 ), we could say that ‘Art is an imagined concept and the Art world is an imagined world’. Art does not exist in the real world as subject matter, it is a concept privately defined in each individual’s intellect and believed by each individual to be shared by others in society. What exists is a collection of individually owned concepts which support each other by means of communication in society. This is true for Art as for all abstract concepts dealt with by the human intellect. Thirdly, is a definition of Art logically impossible? Weitz argues that the extensibility of the concept of Art and its changeability over time make it impossible to define. It is difficult to agree with Weitz on this point. It is like saying that Art cannot be definedby definition. But isn’t that an implicit acceptance of a definition in itself? The mere fact that the concepts of Art is changeable over time should not prevent us from defining it, as changeability and extensibility can be built into a definition. Mandelbaum’s critique appears to be right here, but I will deal with this topic more deeply in the conclusion, when discussing the limits of analytical philosophy. Lastly, Weitz claims that the criteria of recognition and those of evaluation are neither sufficient nor necessary to define a work of art. I will focus on the criteria of recognition, as the criteria of evaluation appear just dispensatory of honorific value and parasitic of inherent criteria of recognition. Obviously there is a complex challenge here, that is to define what the actual criteria of recognition are. Once identified these should be considered at least sufficient if not necessary to the definition of a work of art. We could go along with Weitz’s example that if a piece of driftwood is to be considered‘a lovely piece of sculpture’ this does not tell us that a different object bearing no resemblance nor properties similar to the driftwood cannot be defined as an artefact too. We could then say that we have identified two sets of seemingly different criteria which bear no apparent relation to each other but that taken on their own are individually sufficient to define a work of art. Our challenge would then be to discover whether these two criteria or sets of criteria really have nothing in common with each other or they effectively share some properties. Obviously resemblance or
external properties of the objects would no longer apply here: the objects themselves have no ‘Art’ properties of their own. It is in the complexity of human intellect and human sensitivity and their interaction with the supposed works of art that we have to look for those commonalities that would allow us to put in the same category (and therefore elect to status of works of art) Leonardo’s
Mona Lisa
, Duchamps’
Fountain
and Andy Warhol’s
Empire
. Should we find these commonalities then we would have proven Weitz wrong as these properties would be both sufficient and necessary. Should we not, should we find that there is actually nothing in common between the works of art in question and nothing in common in how we react to them, then we would have proven that Art can be loosely defined by pointing to sets of sufficient properties, none of them necessary, only partially defeating Weitz’s argument. It is tempting to now drill down into the topic and start stating here what the criteria of recognition should be. This however would lead us to add one more theory of Art to the already conspicuous number of theories out there, with dubious results and quickly leading us outside the scope of this essay. Standing therefore within the realm of logical reasoning, we can confidently say that Art being a subjective topic, it is possible to speculate on its definition but it is wrong to claim the authority on the specification of its criteria. To summarise the above points therefore, Weitz misses the point by saying that Art cannot be defined because of its non-essentialism, whilst he may or may not be completely right when he says that criteria of recognition are not sufficient and necessary to define a work of art. Weitz is right though when he says that all known theories fail to capture the essence of Art. This is clearly one of the limitations of analytical philosophy which, with the practice of rationally and sistematically dissecting a topic, relying on necessary and sufficient properties to capture its potentially complex nature in a single definition, fails when it has to deal with complex intellectual concepts. Art, Nation and Love among many others, figure among these complex concepts. They are coined and owned by the human intellect and find no empirical confirmation in the real world. This empirical element is functional to stabilising the meaning of terms and allowing a definition which can be shared by all users of a language.
As Weitz rightly says, the understanding of the concept of Art changes over time. What Weitz fails to mention is that its definition also differs from individual to individual, and this results in an infinite number of possible definitions. This fact should not prevent us from defining Art though. Man has developed complex languages to be able to express complex thoughts, and for as long as we accept the possible looseness and the temporary and subjective limitations of a definition, then a definition of Art is certainly possible
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