Gouldner‘s Patterns of Bureaucracy
In Gouldner‘s (1954) analysis, organizations where managers and employees agree on the compliance of institutional rules have been called ―representative‖ bureaucracies; while organizations where managers and employees negotiate ―adaptations‖ of rules (loose coupling) have been called ―mock‖ bureaucracies. As noted by Hallett and Ventresca (2006b), ―the loose coupling associated with mock bureaucracy is a far cry from the tight coupling that had been a presumed characteristic of bureaucracy prior to the emergence of new institutionalism‖ (p. 221, emphasis in the original). Yet, a third pattern of bureaucracy can arise inside organizations when managers and employees disagree about compliance of rules. If rules are enforced2, a tight coupling between rules and technical activities is present and a pattern of ―punishment-centered‖ bureaucracy arises3 (Gouldner, 1954). Hereinafter, I am going to call this pattern ―discordant‖ bureaucracy, because non-compliance with enforced rules will not necessarily result in punishment.
In any organization all three patterns of bureaucracy are expected to be presented in different proportions (Gouldner, 1954). Hallett and Ventresca (2006b) proposed that social relationships determine the proportion of each pattern inside organizations. Meyer and Rowan (2001) noted that how closely people are inspected by their supervisors also influences the type of bureaucracy. As employees and supervisors actively negotiate different couplings between institutional rules and local practices, different patterns of bureaucracy arise. Therefore, workers‘ perceptions about negotiations involving institutional rules and their bureaucratic orientation are highly dependent on each other.
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And ultimately, the bureaucratic orientation of workers is highly dependent on the organization‘s bureaucratic climate.
Gouldner‘s Patterns of BureaucracyIn Gouldner‘s (1954) analysis, organizations where managers and employees agree on the compliance of institutional rules have been called ―representative‖ bureaucracies; while organizations where managers and employees negotiate ―adaptations‖ of rules (loose coupling) have been called ―mock‖ bureaucracies. As noted by Hallett and Ventresca (2006b), ―the loose coupling associated with mock bureaucracy is a far cry from the tight coupling that had been a presumed characteristic of bureaucracy prior to the emergence of new institutionalism‖ (p. 221, emphasis in the original). Yet, a third pattern of bureaucracy can arise inside organizations when managers and employees disagree about compliance of rules. If rules are enforced2, a tight coupling between rules and technical activities is present and a pattern of ―punishment-centered‖ bureaucracy arises3 (Gouldner, 1954). Hereinafter, I am going to call this pattern ―discordant‖ bureaucracy, because non-compliance with enforced rules will not necessarily result in punishment.In any organization all three patterns of bureaucracy are expected to be presented in different proportions (Gouldner, 1954). Hallett and Ventresca (2006b) proposed that social relationships determine the proportion of each pattern inside organizations. Meyer and Rowan (2001) noted that how closely people are inspected by their supervisors also influences the type of bureaucracy. As employees and supervisors actively negotiate different couplings between institutional rules and local practices, different patterns of bureaucracy arise. Therefore, workers‘ perceptions about negotiations involving institutional rules and their bureaucratic orientation are highly dependent on each other.11And ultimately, the bureaucratic orientation of workers is highly dependent on the organization‘s bureaucratic climate.
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