While economic explanations for the "resource curse" are well established, the political factors explaining why governments fail to take corrective action remain poorly understood. Research has shown that if governments save oil profits abroad and slowly re-introduce the oil-generated revenue into the domestic economy once the rate of return on investment is greater at home than abroad, and perhaps more importantly, once the quality of project implementation has had time to develop, many of the economic problems that plague oil-rich countries can be avoided. The prudence of this strategy is widely advocated and is well-known to oil-rich governments. The question that remains, therefore, is why governments continue to respond to rising oil prices by dramatically increasing domestic spending rather than saving a greater proportion of the windfall abroad? In this dissertation I examine three political factors that affect a government's propensity to save petroleum earnings abroad: political time horizon, elections and the inclusion of fiscal rules in the institutional framework of a country's natural resource fund. Using in-depth case study analysis of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and cross-national statistical analysis, I examine the impact each of the three political factors has on a government's propensity to save oil windfalls abroad and highlight how these factors affect oil revenue management strategies.
The purpose of this study is to examine, through a descriptive and analytical approach, the Saudi perspective on its oil power and policies in world affairs and how the Arab-Israeli conflict affects these policies. A special emphasis on the United States-Saudi Arabian relationship is made, since Saudi Arabia looks at the United States as the key factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
To serve this end, the dissertation is divided into three parts.
Part one examines the economic and political reality of oil power, its implication and limitation. Also this part examines the behavior and the policies of the oil companies, the oil-consuming countries, and the oil-producing countries after the structural change of the oil industry and the shift in control of production and prices from the hands of the oil companies to those of the oil-producing countries.
Part two examines the Saudi Arabian economy, the role of oil in developing this economy, and the effect of Saudi development plans on Saudi oil policies.
Part three examines Saudi foreign policy, especially its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with emphasis on the Saudi oil role in this regard. Also, this part examines the United States-Saudi Arabia relationship and interest, the United States interest in Israel, and, finally, how Riyadh sees these interests affecting United States policies in the Middle East.
While economic explanations for the "resource curse" are well established, the political factors explaining why governments fail to take corrective action remain poorly understood. Research has shown that if governments save oil profits abroad and slowly re-introduce the oil-generated revenue into the domestic economy once the rate of return on investment is greater at home than abroad, and perhaps more importantly, once the quality of project implementation has had time to develop, many of the economic problems that plague oil-rich countries can be avoided. The prudence of this strategy is widely advocated and is well-known to oil-rich governments. The question that remains, therefore, is why governments continue to respond to rising oil prices by dramatically increasing domestic spending rather than saving a greater proportion of the windfall abroad? In this dissertation I examine three political factors that affect a government's propensity to save petroleum earnings abroad: political time horizon, elections and the inclusion of fiscal rules in the institutional framework of a country's natural resource fund. Using in-depth case study analysis of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and cross-national statistical analysis, I examine the impact each of the three political factors has on a government's propensity to save oil windfalls abroad and highlight how these factors affect oil revenue management strategies.
The purpose of this study is to examine, through a descriptive and analytical approach, the Saudi perspective on its oil power and policies in world affairs and how the Arab-Israeli conflict affects these policies. A special emphasis on the United States-Saudi Arabian relationship is made, since Saudi Arabia looks at the United States as the key factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
To serve this end, the dissertation is divided into three parts.
Part one examines the economic and political reality of oil power, its implication and limitation. Also this part examines the behavior and the policies of the oil companies, the oil-consuming countries, and the oil-producing countries after the structural change of the oil industry and the shift in control of production and prices from the hands of the oil companies to those of the oil-producing countries.
Part two examines the Saudi Arabian economy, the role of oil in developing this economy, and the effect of Saudi development plans on Saudi oil policies.
Part three examines Saudi foreign policy, especially its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with emphasis on the Saudi oil role in this regard. Also, this part examines the United States-Saudi Arabia relationship and interest, the United States interest in Israel, and, finally, how Riyadh sees these interests affecting United States policies in the Middle East.
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