In addition to continuing to serve present customers, Sr. Este wanted the company to pursue customers outside Mercosur. As yet, Management had taken no action to investigate external markets, largely because of capital constraints on the firm.
ROSARIO ACERO S.A. ‘S FINANCING ALTERNATIVS
Management was seeking $7.5 million in log-term capital for three purposes in early 1997:
(1)$4.8 million to pay down the company’s present working-capital line of credit;
(2)$975000 to repay long-term debt that would mature in mid-1997;and(3) the remaining
$1725000 for capital improvements and general purposes. The company would retain its
Recently negotiate $5 million working-capital line of credit with Banco de Sol of Buenos
Aires. This line, at 2 percent above the local lending base rate. Was not secured by any col-lateral, though Pablo Este had given a personal guarantee backed by certain commercial real estate he owned. The banker had stated emphatically that an increase in the line of credit and
Release of Pablo Este from his guarantee would be out of successful financial performance.
The private placement of eight-year notes recommended by Raul Martinez would have
The terms set froth in Exhibit 5. The potential purchasers were two Spanish investment
Funds. The fee associated with issuing the placement through sr. Martinez would be
$52000. The prospective investors demanded warrants with the debt, because of the
Firm’s small size, relatively high leverage, and absence of a long history of operating
Profitability. Sr. Martinez explained that the warrants were a “kicker” that increased the effective return to the investors. The covenants associated with this placement were yet
To be negotiated. The Spanish investors told Martinez that the minimum acceptable TBIT
Coverage ratio (i.e., EBIT divided by interest expense would be 2.0. as a foun dation for
Valuing the warrants, sr. Martinez estimated the average volatility of peer steel companies’ shares at 0.35. Martinez had also determined that in several recent comparable private placement of debt, the effective annual cost of the financing to the issuer had been
Between 14 and 16 percent, representing a huge premium over the argentine base lending ratite of 8.5 percent.
A second financing alternative that Pablo este considered was an initial public offering
(IPO) of the company’s stock. While the 233000 shares of stock currently outstanding
Were not presently traded, six senior managers had been offered (and had accepted) a
Chance to invest three times since the company’s inception at prices as follows:
December 1994:15480 chares at $3.00/chare.
January 1995:14220 chares at $4.00/chare.
December1996:28550 chares at $9.00/chare.
These purchases accounted for management’s 25 percent equity interest in the firm