), and argue that audit quality is
determined by both client demand and auditor supply, which depends upon the incentives and competencies of the client
and auditor. The demand for audit quality arises from client incentives, as determined by factors such as agency costs and
regulation; and the client competency in meeting this demand, as reflected in factors such as the audit committee and the
internal audit function. The supply of audit quality is affected by auditor incentives for independence, as determined by
factors such as reputation, litigation and regulatory concerns; and auditor competency in supplying audit quality, as
reflected in factors such as expertise and engagement-level inputs to the audit process. Thus, variation across clients’ and
auditors’ incentives and competencies lead to variation in audit quality. Importantly, regulatory intervention plays a critical
role in shaping both the incentives and competencies that drive client demand and auditor supply of audit quality, and most
of the research we review is motivated by regulatory concerns. Thus, we separately consider the effects of regulatory
intervention on the demand and supply factors that affect audit quality. Fig. 1 summarizes our framework for viewing audit
quality as a function of client demand and auditor supply, both of which are affected by regulatory intervention.