Our intuition is that imagined physical warmth (or coldness) can indeed impact person evaluation, but only under quite specific triggering conditions. A central tenet of embodiment is that when cognition is offline (e.g., during mental simulation), activity continues in modality-specific systems (Barsalou, 1999 and Wilson, 2002). As Niedenthal et al. (2005) report, “just thinking about an object produces embodied states as if the object were actually there” (p. 187). But is this really the case for all mental simulations? Are embodied states (e.g., modality-specific re-enactments) an inevitable accompaniment to offline cognition? We suspect not. When imagining an event (e.g., holding a cup of coffee), it is possible to adopt one of two viewpoints: an egocentric (i.e., first-person) or allocentric (i.e., third-person) spatial visual perspective (Avraamides & Kelly, 2008). From an egocentric (i.e., actor) perspective, people experience events through their own eyes, as if they were looking outward on the world. In contrast, from an allocentric (i.e., observer) perspective they see themselves through the eyes of others, as actors embedded in an event (Libby & Eibach, 2011).