To understand how tensions have heated up, we have to look back at the nation-building process of the past few decades. Close connections between the chaebols and the government have cre- ated mutual benefits, market share monopoly and political influ- ence, says Kim Woo-chan, an associate professor at the Korea University Business School
The 1987 uprising that toppled the despot Chun Doo-hwan and ushered in democracy also got people asking a lot of questions about how things were run. That included a business playing field tilted in favour of the chaebols with low borrowing costs, cross-shareholding, and high debt-equity ratios but low profita- bility, said Mr Kim.
The chaebols operated in an environment of moral hazard, an implicit understanding that they would be bailed out no matter what happened. But the 1997 crisis hit Korea especially hard and resulted in calls for major business reform. Even so, the chae- bols have managed in recent years to quietly reverse some of the reforms put in place in 1999, such as a ban on debt guarantees, requirements for board approval and disclosure of related-party transactions, cross-shareholding curbs, and ceilings on equity investments in affiliates, Mr Kim noted