We emphasize that this paper does not intend to offer a general theory of standard-setting and note several caveats. We
focus the model on the market price impact of a new rule. This has the benefit of focusing the model on trade-offs discussed
in the extensive disclosure literature, but also comes with the limitations inherent to this family of models. In particular, we
cannot discuss issues that pertain to stewardship problems as, for example, in the case of standards about compensation
measurement or regulatory capital ratios. In addition, the model focuses on influence by parties interested in increasing the
short-term stock price. We do not offer here a game-theoretic model in which a standard-setter plays a political game to stir
political forces toward a preferred outcome (see Amershi et al., 1982 and Bertomeu and Cheynel, 2013 for models of active
standard-setting). Hence, our baseline model does not predict the relatively recent trend toward fair-value accounting.1