1997, 179). One might wonder, if I truly am the entire universe, from what do I need to
protect myself? From the Mahāyāna Buddhist‘s perspective, all of these problems and
contradictions arise because deep ecologists insist on viewing the self and other beings as
possessing svabhāva and on wanting to establish what their relationship to each other is.
Since neither the self nor the other can be found to exist inherently, in Mahāyāna
Buddhism, ‗they‘ can neither be said to be the same nor different.99 Through basing
identification on emptiness, we can also avoid the metaphysical discourse of holism and
of interrelatedness.
In sum, basing identification on emptiness instead of on assertions of identity or
difference allows us to get around some of the controversies and difficulties that arise in
deep ecology. Yet, as we shall see, it only offers a limited way out of the quandaries that
were brought up in chapter 1, where we first considered the possibility of establishing
environmentalism on solicitude.
Difficulties with Basing Environmental Ethics upon Bodhicitta
1) Discriminating between competing interests
The most important problem that emerged from the discussion on solicitude, in chapter 1,
was that promoting the welfare of all sentient beings indiscriminately could not serve as a
basis for a sound environmental policy. Generating universal love and compassion cannot
aid us to arbitrate between the needs of diverse beings, since it is all suffering that is to be
eliminated under this account, no matter to whom it belongs. Similarly, not many issues
in environmentalism can be settled directly by appealing to bodhicitta—whether it is a
case of human interests versus those of nature, holistic priorities versus individualistic
needs, indigenous species versus exotics—the bodhisattva is concerned to reduce
suffering wherever it is found, and cannot discriminate on any grounds. Moreover, since
promoting a being‘s needs very often involves harming another, the ecologically aware
bodhisattva might find the task of eliminating all suffering rather hopeless.
99 It will be recalled that, ultimately, the statement ―neither the same nor different‖ is also negated, and the
ideal answer, as in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, would be to remain in silence.
1997, 179). One might wonder, if I truly am the entire universe, from what do I need to
protect myself? From the Mahāyāna Buddhist‘s perspective, all of these problems and
contradictions arise because deep ecologists insist on viewing the self and other beings as
possessing svabhāva and on wanting to establish what their relationship to each other is.
Since neither the self nor the other can be found to exist inherently, in Mahāyāna
Buddhism, ‗they‘ can neither be said to be the same nor different.99 Through basing
identification on emptiness, we can also avoid the metaphysical discourse of holism and
of interrelatedness.
In sum, basing identification on emptiness instead of on assertions of identity or
difference allows us to get around some of the controversies and difficulties that arise in
deep ecology. Yet, as we shall see, it only offers a limited way out of the quandaries that
were brought up in chapter 1, where we first considered the possibility of establishing
environmentalism on solicitude.
Difficulties with Basing Environmental Ethics upon Bodhicitta
1) Discriminating between competing interests
The most important problem that emerged from the discussion on solicitude, in chapter 1,
was that promoting the welfare of all sentient beings indiscriminately could not serve as a
basis for a sound environmental policy. Generating universal love and compassion cannot
aid us to arbitrate between the needs of diverse beings, since it is all suffering that is to be
eliminated under this account, no matter to whom it belongs. Similarly, not many issues
in environmentalism can be settled directly by appealing to bodhicitta—whether it is a
case of human interests versus those of nature, holistic priorities versus individualistic
needs, indigenous species versus exotics—the bodhisattva is concerned to reduce
suffering wherever it is found, and cannot discriminate on any grounds. Moreover, since
promoting a being‘s needs very often involves harming another, the ecologically aware
bodhisattva might find the task of eliminating all suffering rather hopeless.
99 It will be recalled that, ultimately, the statement ―neither the same nor different‖ is also negated, and the
ideal answer, as in the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, would be to remain in silence.
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