However, human dignity does not always remain in the background. For example, section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that ‘Everyone has inherent dignity [implying a background idea] and the right to have their dignity respected and protected and protected [implying a foreground claim]’. Furthermore, section 35 requires that the conditions of detention (of arrested, detained, and accused persons) must be ‘consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment’. And, as we have seen, even in the International Bill of Rights, references to human dignity are occasionally made in the Articles. Yet if human dignity is the foundation on which human rights are constructed, what are we to make of human dignity when it is incorporated into general rights claims (such as the right to have one’s dignity respected and protected) or specific claims? The frequent appeal to the principle of respect for human dignity in the context of the deprivation of liberty (an appeal found, as we have seen, in both Article 10 ICCPR as well as section 35 of the South African Constitution) is a good test case.