Our first measure of earnings opacity is earnings aggressiveness. Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) argue that the opposite of aggressiveness, accounting conservatism, which is the more timely incorporation of economic losses versus economic gains into accounting earnings, arises to reduce information asymmetry. Specifically, they argue that three factors are expected to lead to accounting conservatism. First, accountants are aware that managers would like to report economic gains and suppress information about economic losses. Hence, accountants find negative information more credible, and are more likely to incorporate it into accounting income. Second, lenders are important users of financial statements. and lenders are more impacted by economic losses than by economic gains. Third, the timely incorporation of economic losses provides an important corporate governance role, providing quick feedback about bad investment decisions and strategies that managers may not wish to disclose. The first and third of these factors suggest that accounting conservatism is related to infom1ativeness, since conservative accounting is expected to provide information that management might have incentives to withhold otherwise.