Viewpoints such as those expressed by lobby groups, such as ETAN, that
East Timor could and should have held out for a better deal, as their advo-cacy and international as well as grassroots pressure on the Australian government was “only beginning to be effective,” therefore seem to be over-optimistic and misplaced (as well as impossible to prove or disprove). For
example, the Timor Sea issue did not become an especially salient one in the
course of the Australian electoral campaign of 2004. Furthermore, Australia’s
position in the course of the negotiations did not appear to soften noticeably
as a consequence of the activities of lobbyists and pressure groups or in the
face of international criticism. Indeed, the Australian government has proved
to be rather adept at shrugging off such complaints. Suggestions that CMATS,
once agreed, could be amended or renegotiated, seem to be similarly unrealistic