SHELLEY E. TAYLOR AND JONATHON D. BROWN
Summary and Implications
To summarize, we return to the criteria of mental health
offered earlier and relate them systematically to positive illusions.
Those criteria include happiness or contentment, caring
for and about others, and the capacity for creative, productive
work. Although research does not systematically address the
role of each of the three positive illusions with respect to each
criterion of mental health, the evidence is suggestive in all cases.
Happy people are more likely to have positive conceptions of
themselves, a belief in their ability to control what goes on
around them, and optimism about the future. They also typically
have high self-esteem. The ability to care for others appears
to be associated with positive illusions in that illusions are
associated with certain aspects of social bonding. The capacity
for creative, productive work is fostered both by enhanced intellectual
functioning, which may be an outgrowth of positive illusions,
and by the increased motivation, activity level, and persistence
that are clearly fostered by a positive sense of self, a sense
of control, and optimism.
Accommodating Illusions to Reality
The previous analysis presents some theoretical and practical
dilemmas. On the one hand, we have an established view of
mental health coming largely from the fields of psychiatry and
clinical psychology that stresses the importance of accurate perceptions
of the self, one's circumstances, and the future. On the
other hand, we have a sharply different portrait from cognitive
and social psychology of the normal individual as one who evidences
substantial biases in these perceptions. Moreover, these
biases fall in a predictable direction, namely, a positive one.
How are we to reconcile these viewpoints?
A second dilemma concerns the functional value of illusions.
On the one hand, positive illusions appear to be common and,
more important, appear to be associated with positive outcomes
that promote good mental health. On the other hand,
this evidence flies in the face of much clinical wisdom as well as
commonsense notions that people must monitor reality accurately
to survive. Thus, it is important to consider how positive
illusions can be maintained and, more important, can be functional
in the face of realistic and often contradictory evidence
from the environment.
Reconciling Contradictory Views of Mental Health
In addressing the first dilemma, a useful point of departure
in a reconciliation is to examine the potential flaws in the datagathering
methods of the relevant clinical and social psychological
literatures in deriving their respective portraits. Historically,
clinical constructions of mental health have been dominated by
therapy with and research on abnormal people. Many psychologists
and psychiatrists who have written about mental health
devote their research and clinical endeavors to individuals
whose perceptions are disturbed in a variety of ways. How
might an understanding of mental health be influenced when
abnormality is an implicit yardstick? Contrasts between pathological
and normal functioning are likely to loom large. Because
an attribute of many psychologically disturbed people is an inability
to monitor reality effectively, the healthy individual may
be portrayed as one who maintains very close contact with reality.
More subtle deviations in perceptions and cognitions from
objectively accurate standards may well go unnoticed.
But just as a strict clinical view of mental health may result in
an overemphasis on rationality, a view of mental health derived
solely from social cognition research may be skewed to reveal
an overemphasis on illusions. Much research in social cognition
extricates individuals from the normal settings in which they
interact for the purpose of providing them with experimentally
manipulated information and feedback. Yet social and cognitive
research on the prevalence and usefulness of schemata
makes clear that people rely heavily on their prior expectations
for processing incoming data (see Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Hastie,
1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981, for reviews). To the extent that
manipulated information and feedback are similar to the information
and feedback that people normally encounter in their
chosen environments, one might expect to see perceptions similar
to those that people usually develop in their normal world.
However, to the extent that the information and feedback that
are provided experimentally deviate from the usual information
and feedback that an individual might encounter in the real
world, the implications of any errors and biases in perception
and cognition are unclear. Within social cognition, these experimentally
documented errors and biases are often interpreted as
evidence for flaws in human information-processing strategies.
Another interpretation, however, is at least as tenable. Individuals
may merely assimilate unfamiliar or unexpected data to
their prior beliefs with relatively little processing at all. If prior
beliefs include generally positive views of the self, personal
efficacy, and the future, then interpretation of any negative feedback
may appear, falsely, to be error prone in a positive direction.
Taking these respective flaws of the social and clinical portraits
into account, what kind of reconciliation can we develop?
First, a certain degree of contact with reality seems to be essential
to accomplish the tasks of everyday life. If the errors and
biases identified by social cognition dominated all inferential
tasks, it would be difficult to understand how the human organism
could leam. On the other hand, it is also evident that when
errors and biases do occur, they are not evenly distributed. They
consistently stray in a positive direction, toward the aggrandizement
of the self and the world in which one must function. The
key to an integration of the two views of mental health may,
then, lie in understanding those circumstances under which
positive illusions about the self and the world may be most obvious
and useful. The nature of these circumstances is suggested
both by social cognition research itself and by research on victims
of misfortune.
If one assumes either that people's prior beliefs about themselves,
their efficacy, and their future are positive or that their
information-processing strategies bias them to interpret information
in this way, then it follows that errors and biases will be
most obvious when feedback from the real world is negative. In
fact, in experimental circumstances examining positive biases,
research reveals that positive biases are more apparent as
threats to the self increase (Greenwald, 1981). The importance
ILLUSION AND WELL-BEING 201
of information may also alter the prevalence of positive biases.
Greenwald (1981) found self-enhancing biases to be more in
evidence as the importance of the situation increased. Thus, for
example, the self-serving causal attribution bias is more likely
to occur for behaviors that are important to an individual than
for personally trivial events (e.g., Miller, 1976).
Consistent with both points, research with victims of misfortune,
such as cancer patients, suggests that illusions about the
self, one's efficacy, and the future are in evidence in dealing with
these potentially tragic events (Taylor, 1983). For example, a
study of patients with breast cancer found that the belief that
one's coping abilities were extraordinary (Wood, Taylor, &
Lichtman, 1985) and the belief that one could personally prevent
the cancer from coming back, even in the face of a likely
recurrence, were quite common (Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood,
1984). More to the point, they were associated with successful
psychological adjustment to the cancer.
In a recent review of the literature on personality factors as
buffers of the stress-disorder relation, Cohen and Edwards (in
press) found only scattered evidence for stress-buffering effects
across a large number of personality variables; they suggested
that this may occur because only a few superordinate mechanisms
actually buffer stress successfully. Significantly, they
offered as possible superordinate mechanisms feelings of personal
control, self-efficacy or self-esteem, optimism, and effort
or ability. At present, the evidence is strongest for sense of personal
control. Their analysis provides converging evidence for
the potential functional value of self-enhancement, personal
control, optimism, and their concomitants under conditions of
threat. Becker (1973) made a related point in his Pulitzer-Prizewinning
book, The Denial of Death. He argued that because
the world is an uncertain and frightening place to live in, people
create positive, life-affirming illusions to enable them to cope
with their existential terror (cf. J. Greenberg, Pyszczynski, &
Solomon, 1986).
To summarize then, evidence from converging sources suggests
that positive illusions about the self, one's control, and the
future may be especially apparent and adaptive under circumstances
of adversity, that is, circumstances that might be expected
to produce depression or lack of motivation. Under these
circumstances, the belief in one's self as a competent, efficacious
actor behaving in a world with a generally positive future
may be especially helpful in overcoming setbacks, potential
blows to self-esteem, and potential erosions in one's view of the
future.
Management of Negative Feedback
If illusions are particularly functional when a person encounters
negative feedback, we must consider, first, how the process
of rejecting versus accommodating negative feedback occurs
and, second, how people negotiate the world successfully and
learn from experience without the full benefit of negative feedback.
To anticipate the forthcoming argument, we maintain
that a series of social and cognitive filters make information disproportionately
positive and that the negative information that
escapes these filter
SHELLEY E. TAYLOR AND JONATHON D. BROWN
Summary and Implications
To summarize, we return to the criteria of mental health
offered earlier and relate them systematically to positive illusions.
Those criteria include happiness or contentment, caring
for and about others, and the capacity for creative, productive
work. Although research does not systematically address the
role of each of the three positive illusions with respect to each
criterion of mental health, the evidence is suggestive in all cases.
Happy people are more likely to have positive conceptions of
themselves, a belief in their ability to control what goes on
around them, and optimism about the future. They also typically
have high self-esteem. The ability to care for others appears
to be associated with positive illusions in that illusions are
associated with certain aspects of social bonding. The capacity
for creative, productive work is fostered both by enhanced intellectual
functioning, which may be an outgrowth of positive illusions,
and by the increased motivation, activity level, and persistence
that are clearly fostered by a positive sense of self, a sense
of control, and optimism.
Accommodating Illusions to Reality
The previous analysis presents some theoretical and practical
dilemmas. On the one hand, we have an established view of
mental health coming largely from the fields of psychiatry and
clinical psychology that stresses the importance of accurate perceptions
of the self, one's circumstances, and the future. On the
other hand, we have a sharply different portrait from cognitive
and social psychology of the normal individual as one who evidences
substantial biases in these perceptions. Moreover, these
biases fall in a predictable direction, namely, a positive one.
How are we to reconcile these viewpoints?
A second dilemma concerns the functional value of illusions.
On the one hand, positive illusions appear to be common and,
more important, appear to be associated with positive outcomes
that promote good mental health. On the other hand,
this evidence flies in the face of much clinical wisdom as well as
commonsense notions that people must monitor reality accurately
to survive. Thus, it is important to consider how positive
illusions can be maintained and, more important, can be functional
in the face of realistic and often contradictory evidence
from the environment.
Reconciling Contradictory Views of Mental Health
In addressing the first dilemma, a useful point of departure
in a reconciliation is to examine the potential flaws in the datagathering
methods of the relevant clinical and social psychological
literatures in deriving their respective portraits. Historically,
clinical constructions of mental health have been dominated by
therapy with and research on abnormal people. Many psychologists
and psychiatrists who have written about mental health
devote their research and clinical endeavors to individuals
whose perceptions are disturbed in a variety of ways. How
might an understanding of mental health be influenced when
abnormality is an implicit yardstick? Contrasts between pathological
and normal functioning are likely to loom large. Because
an attribute of many psychologically disturbed people is an inability
to monitor reality effectively, the healthy individual may
be portrayed as one who maintains very close contact with reality.
More subtle deviations in perceptions and cognitions from
objectively accurate standards may well go unnoticed.
But just as a strict clinical view of mental health may result in
an overemphasis on rationality, a view of mental health derived
solely from social cognition research may be skewed to reveal
an overemphasis on illusions. Much research in social cognition
extricates individuals from the normal settings in which they
interact for the purpose of providing them with experimentally
manipulated information and feedback. Yet social and cognitive
research on the prevalence and usefulness of schemata
makes clear that people rely heavily on their prior expectations
for processing incoming data (see Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Hastie,
1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981, for reviews). To the extent that
manipulated information and feedback are similar to the information
and feedback that people normally encounter in their
chosen environments, one might expect to see perceptions similar
to those that people usually develop in their normal world.
However, to the extent that the information and feedback that
are provided experimentally deviate from the usual information
and feedback that an individual might encounter in the real
world, the implications of any errors and biases in perception
and cognition are unclear. Within social cognition, these experimentally
documented errors and biases are often interpreted as
evidence for flaws in human information-processing strategies.
Another interpretation, however, is at least as tenable. Individuals
may merely assimilate unfamiliar or unexpected data to
their prior beliefs with relatively little processing at all. If prior
beliefs include generally positive views of the self, personal
efficacy, and the future, then interpretation of any negative feedback
may appear, falsely, to be error prone in a positive direction.
Taking these respective flaws of the social and clinical portraits
into account, what kind of reconciliation can we develop?
First, a certain degree of contact with reality seems to be essential
to accomplish the tasks of everyday life. If the errors and
biases identified by social cognition dominated all inferential
tasks, it would be difficult to understand how the human organism
could leam. On the other hand, it is also evident that when
errors and biases do occur, they are not evenly distributed. They
consistently stray in a positive direction, toward the aggrandizement
of the self and the world in which one must function. The
key to an integration of the two views of mental health may,
then, lie in understanding those circumstances under which
positive illusions about the self and the world may be most obvious
and useful. The nature of these circumstances is suggested
both by social cognition research itself and by research on victims
of misfortune.
If one assumes either that people's prior beliefs about themselves,
their efficacy, and their future are positive or that their
information-processing strategies bias them to interpret information
in this way, then it follows that errors and biases will be
most obvious when feedback from the real world is negative. In
fact, in experimental circumstances examining positive biases,
research reveals that positive biases are more apparent as
threats to the self increase (Greenwald, 1981). The importance
ILLUSION AND WELL-BEING 201
of information may also alter the prevalence of positive biases.
Greenwald (1981) found self-enhancing biases to be more in
evidence as the importance of the situation increased. Thus, for
example, the self-serving causal attribution bias is more likely
to occur for behaviors that are important to an individual than
for personally trivial events (e.g., Miller, 1976).
Consistent with both points, research with victims of misfortune,
such as cancer patients, suggests that illusions about the
self, one's efficacy, and the future are in evidence in dealing with
these potentially tragic events (Taylor, 1983). For example, a
study of patients with breast cancer found that the belief that
one's coping abilities were extraordinary (Wood, Taylor, &
Lichtman, 1985) and the belief that one could personally prevent
the cancer from coming back, even in the face of a likely
recurrence, were quite common (Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood,
1984). More to the point, they were associated with successful
psychological adjustment to the cancer.
In a recent review of the literature on personality factors as
buffers of the stress-disorder relation, Cohen and Edwards (in
press) found only scattered evidence for stress-buffering effects
across a large number of personality variables; they suggested
that this may occur because only a few superordinate mechanisms
actually buffer stress successfully. Significantly, they
offered as possible superordinate mechanisms feelings of personal
control, self-efficacy or self-esteem, optimism, and effort
or ability. At present, the evidence is strongest for sense of personal
control. Their analysis provides converging evidence for
the potential functional value of self-enhancement, personal
control, optimism, and their concomitants under conditions of
threat. Becker (1973) made a related point in his Pulitzer-Prizewinning
book, The Denial of Death. He argued that because
the world is an uncertain and frightening place to live in, people
create positive, life-affirming illusions to enable them to cope
with their existential terror (cf. J. Greenberg, Pyszczynski, &
Solomon, 1986).
To summarize then, evidence from converging sources suggests
that positive illusions about the self, one's control, and the
future may be especially apparent and adaptive under circumstances
of adversity, that is, circumstances that might be expected
to produce depression or lack of motivation. Under these
circumstances, the belief in one's self as a competent, efficacious
actor behaving in a world with a generally positive future
may be especially helpful in overcoming setbacks, potential
blows to self-esteem, and potential erosions in one's view of the
future.
Management of Negative Feedback
If illusions are particularly functional when a person encounters
negative feedback, we must consider, first, how the process
of rejecting versus accommodating negative feedback occurs
and, second, how people negotiate the world successfully and
learn from experience without the full benefit of negative feedback.
To anticipate the forthcoming argument, we maintain
that a series of social and cognitive filters make information disproportionately
positive and that the negative information that
escapes these filter
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