A common understanding among the interviewees was that street level officials find it difficult to resist the temptation of corruption due to their low pay. Common-sense supports the idea of contributory influence of low income on potentially corrupt agents. The latter was confirmed by a study that explained tax officials’ engagement in corruption as a course of action dictated by economic necessity (Chand and Moene, 1997). Its authors also report that most fiscal officials seem to have a sense of professionalism: however, when paid a salary that is below that required for basic subsistence, they are forced to accept bribes. Systematic civil service corruption is likely to be encountered in situations where public sector pay falls below a subsistence minimum (Stapenhurst and Langseth, 1997, pp. 317-8). Abbink (2000) stresses the need to pay civil servants fair salaries, thus emphasising the importance of relative wages. Although there are good examples of the positive effect of high salaries in reducing corruption, the assumption that higher salaries would increase ethical behaviour in law enforcement institutions is contested by Sosa (2004), who argues that anti-corruption policies aimed at increasing the income of corruption fighters may simply result in higher bribes being asked for corrupt favours. Again, the example of Enron showed that high incomes did not prevent managers from engaging in fraudulent practices.