Great Power and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia
Analyzing Regional Security Strategies
Evelyn Goh
When the cold war ended in early 1990s, many leading scholars offered a bleak prognosis for East Asia: with the decline of the Soviet Union and the rise of China, the region would move forward an unstable multi-polar order, as the United States drew down its forces, Japan demilitarized, China’s economic and military power grew, and other countries in the region began to engage in arms races. More than a decade and a half late, however, East Asia has not descended into intense security competition with a high risk of violent conflict as predicted; instead an interim order that incorporates the United States, china, and other major regional players continues to prevail.
Why has East Asia enjoyed relative stability and peace in the post-Cold War era? The answer can be found partly in great power dynamics. The region has remained stable since 1990 largely because the United States has maintained its web of alliances and its deep economic and strategic involvement in the region; and it has avoided major conflicts partly because China has chosen not to aggressively challenge the status quo. These great power policy decisions, however, have also been influenced by the actions and persuasion of other regional states. In particular, the relatively peaceful transition so far may be the result of two complementary Strategies on the part of key East Asia States such as Japan and leading countries of Southeast Asia: (1) the building of regional multilateral institution that serve to regulate exchanges, develop norms, and create regional identity, thereby institutionalizing cooperation among the major power and socializing China; and (2) indirect balancing against potential Chinese (or other aggressive) power by facilitating the continued U.S. security commitment to the region.
While a discussion of broader East Asia security must focus on Northeast Asian dynamics such as the China-Japan relationship and the situation on the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asia Nation (ASEAN) have become an important focus for those seeking to develop an understanding of regional strategies to cope with the changing distribution of power after the Cold War. At the same time, rapidly improving Sino Southeast Asia ties since the mid-1990s have garnered attention and some concern among U.S. policymakers, observers, and scholars. In June 2004 Assistant Secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly claimed that China was ”challenging the status quo aggressively,” citing as the only example Beijing “expanding its influence in Southeast Asia by enhancing its diplomatic representation, increasing foreign assistance, and signing new bilateral and regional agreements.” While most Asia scholars note that China’s successful “charm offensive” has assuaged many but not all suspicions in Southeast Asia, other analysts see that its growing economic clout and deft diplomacy already mean that “China is rapidly becoming the predominant power in Southeast Asia … leaving in question the U.S. role and commitment to the region, even with traditional allies and friends.”
Southeast Asia’s mixed approaches to regional security after the end of the Cold War and with the rise of China, however, are not easily characterized using the prevailing lenses in international relations theory. They have generated debates about whether realist balancing or liberal institutionalism is more salient in explaining regional stability. And at which juncture of the power transition. More specifically, scholars disagree over two sets of questions: (1) whether Southeast Asia is balancing against China or accommodating, aligning, or even bandwagoning with it; and (2) whether the must-touted ASEAN-led regional institutions that have been created since the early 1990s have indeed moved toward regional security community, or are merely talk shops playing into the hands of great power interests.