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UVA-F-1483
education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be
discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar
result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education. Some graduates will
find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which
means that whoever paid for the education didn’t get his money’s worth. In other
cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result
that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book
value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.
11
To illustrate the mechanics of this example, consider the hypothetical case presented in
Exhibit 4
. Suppose an individual has the opportunity to invest $50 million in a business—
this is its cost or book value. This business will throw off cash at the rate of 20% of its
investment base each year. Suppose that instead of receiving any dividends, the owner
decides to reinvest all cash flow back into the business—at this rate, the book value of the
business will grow at 20% per year. Suppose that the investor plans to sell the business for
its book value at the end of the fifth year. Does this investment create value for the
individual? One determines this by discounting the future cash flows to the present at a cost
of equity of 15%. Suppose that this is the investor’s opportunity cost, the required return that
could have been earned elsewhere at comparable risk. Dividing the present value of future
cash flows (i.e., Buffett’s intrinsic value) by the cost of the investment (i.e., Buffett’s book
value) indicates that every dollar invested buys securities worth $1.23. Value is created.
Consider an opposing case, summarized in
Exhibit 5
. The example is similar in all respects,
except for one key difference: the annual return on the investment is 10%. The result is that
every dollar invested buys securities worth $0.80. Value is destroyed.
Comparing the two cases in
Exhibits 4
and
5
, the difference in value creation and
destruction is driven entirely by the relationship between the expected returns and the
discount rate: in the first case, the spread is positive; in the second case, it is negative. Only
in the instance where expected returns equal the discount rate will book value equal intrinsic
value. In short, book value or the investment outlay may not reflect the economic reality.
One needs to focus on the prospective rates of return, and how they compare to the required
rate of return.
4.
Measure performance by gain in intrinsic value, not accounting profit
. Buffett wrote:
Our long-term economic goal … is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate
of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the
economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by
per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will
diminish in the future—a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we
will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large
American corporation.
12
11
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 1994 Annual Report,
7.
12
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 2004 Annual Report, 74.
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UVA-F-1483
education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be
discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar
result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education. Some graduates will
find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which
means that whoever paid for the education didn’t get his money’s worth. In other
cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result
that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book
value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.
11
To illustrate the mechanics of this example, consider the hypothetical case presented in
Exhibit 4
. Suppose an individual has the opportunity to invest $50 million in a business—
this is its cost or book value. This business will throw off cash at the rate of 20% of its
investment base each year. Suppose that instead of receiving any dividends, the owner
decides to reinvest all cash flow back into the business—at this rate, the book value of the
business will grow at 20% per year. Suppose that the investor plans to sell the business for
its book value at the end of the fifth year. Does this investment create value for the
individual? One determines this by discounting the future cash flows to the present at a cost
of equity of 15%. Suppose that this is the investor’s opportunity cost, the required return that
could have been earned elsewhere at comparable risk. Dividing the present value of future
cash flows (i.e., Buffett’s intrinsic value) by the cost of the investment (i.e., Buffett’s book
value) indicates that every dollar invested buys securities worth $1.23. Value is created.
Consider an opposing case, summarized in
Exhibit 5
. The example is similar in all respects,
except for one key difference: the annual return on the investment is 10%. The result is that
every dollar invested buys securities worth $0.80. Value is destroyed.
Comparing the two cases in
Exhibits 4
and
5
, the difference in value creation and
destruction is driven entirely by the relationship between the expected returns and the
discount rate: in the first case, the spread is positive; in the second case, it is negative. Only
in the instance where expected returns equal the discount rate will book value equal intrinsic
value. In short, book value or the investment outlay may not reflect the economic reality.
One needs to focus on the prospective rates of return, and how they compare to the required
rate of return.
4.
Measure performance by gain in intrinsic value, not accounting profit
. Buffett wrote:
Our long-term economic goal … is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate
of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the
economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by
per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will
diminish in the future—a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we
will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large
American corporation.
12
11
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 1994 Annual Report,
7.
12
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 2004 Annual Report, 74.
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