(a) Price discovery and arbitrage. Does the new
competition for order flow from multiple markets
affect price discovery? Does information that arises
in the new overseas market affect price
determination? Do the competing markets lead to
fragmentation that generates systematic deviations
from price parity or arbitrage opportunities?
(b) Multi-market trading and liquidity. Does a new
international cross-listing lead to a more liquid
trading environment for the shares in the home
market? What fundamental factors impact the share
of trading captured by the cross-listed shares? Is
increased trading in the new overseas cross-listed
market permanent or just a transitory effect
associated with the listing event itself? Does it spur
on greater integration with global markets and faster
economic development by attracting global
investors to the local markets? Or, do these
secondary cross-listings divert trading activity away
from local markets to the new overseas markets in
which shares newly trade, resulting in a
deterioration of the quality of the home market?
One very important new research initiative on the
topic of international cross-listings that will not be
reviewed in this chapter (but reserved for another separate
chapter) focuses on the role of corporate governance,
agency conflicts, and what is often referred to
as the ‘bonding hypothesis.’ The ability of dominant controlling
shareholders and managers, who are present in
so many corporations around the world, to consume private
benefits from the firms that they control is an important
aspect of corporate governance as it defines
potential agency conflicts with public shareholders. After
all, firms can raise external financing from those
shareholders only to the extent that they can commit
to return this capital to investors and to not extract it
for the use of the controlling shareholders or managers.
In many countries around the world, good laws and