This study has examined whether managers use income-increasing or decreasing discretionary accruals under different financial distress situations. The study is based on financially distressed firms with debt covenant violations and/or debt restructuring during the 1989-96 period. The firms with debt covenant violations are categorized into waiver and nonwaiver firms, and permanent and temporary waivers firms. Discretionary accruals are calculated based on modified Jones's time-series and cross-sectional models as well as CFO and performance-matched models.
The results show that the managers use positive discretionary accruals when financially distressed firms are granted waivers for debt covenant violations, and they use negative discretionary accruals when waivers are not granted and the debt contract terms are renegotiated, especially when the troubled debts are restructured. These results suggest That the managers use income-increasing discretionary accruals if technical default is due to temporary financial difficulties and the firm is basically in good financial condition, which is recognized by creditors by granting waivers for debt covenant violations. If financial distress is severe and waivers for debt covenant violations are not granted, especially when financial distress leads to debt restructuring, the managers use negative discretionary accruals to highlight the firm's financial difficulties, which may enable them to negotiate better terms for debt contracts.
These findings explain the differences in the results of earlier studies by showing that the choice of positive and negative discretionary accruals depends on the severity of financial distress. They also add to our better understanding of earnings management behavior under the conditions of financial distress and enrich the literature on the association between financial distress and choice of accounting policies.