to substitute a better foreign rule for much 'that is archaic and foolish' in their own law. 23 On the other hand, the court may reject the foreign rule of law, and apply the lex fori because it feels that the latter is the better rule of law. One author claims that, "the search for the better rule of law may lead a court almost automatically to its own lawbooks." 24 One American judge has confessed to this judicial sleight-of-hand and has said, We prefer to apply the better rule of law in conflicts cases just as is done in non-conflicts cases, when the choice is open to us. If the law of some other state is outmoded,... we will try to see our way clear to apply our own law instead... Courts have always done this in conflicts cases, but have usually covered up what they have done by employing manipulative techniques such as characterization and renvoi. 25 Thus it seems that the logical intricacies and the evidentiary problems which accompany the renvoi doctrine may in fact prove to be effective guises for judicial eclecticism and law reform. While judicial law-making may, in certain contexts, be a commendable activity toward the development of the lex fori, it is not altogether evident that a case should provide this opportunity merely because it raises foreign fact elements. Further, this type of judicial activity clearly detracts from the parties' expectations of certainty. In summary then, it is apparent that the renvoi doctrine is subject to many weaknesses. It is built on the shaky foundation of purporting to recognize foreign acquired rights, it contains inherent logical fallacies, its application requires the inefficient and often misplaced reliance on expert testimony, and finally, the ultimate choice of the lex causae may reflect arbitrary judicial discretion rather than a rigorous and consistent application of the doctrine. In light of these criticisms, it is difficult to support utili- zation of the renvoi doctrine as a valid technique for the choice of the proper lex causae. It is almost devoid of the certainty and the predictability that are desirable in a court of law.
4. Towards a Reformulation of Choice of Law Principles
As stated at the outset, the essential question in the choice of law problem is when, and to what extent, the lex fori should be