b.
"Belgian Chocolate" Lenders' Financial Benefit
The plain vanilla lender who charges within what might be considered a standard range for interest rates and fees might be different from what might be termed a "Belgian chocolate" lender. Such a lender is one who charges a premium rate of interest and/or fees beyond the standard range. In such a case, the lender's unusually high interest rate or fees might directly arise from the fact of higher risk associated with on-going or potential infringement. This would raise the red flag of financial benefit, as the rate and/or fees are tied to infringement. Though the above average interest rate might not change with the level of infringement, it arises because of it, and is therefore problematic. A critic might say this reads some knowledge into vicarious liability. While, as noted above, knowledge of infringement is not a requirement of vicarious liability, n239 it can be considered in the analysis. The Supreme Court in 2005reiterated in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. n240 an idea it had previously explained two decades earlier in Sony n241: "the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not [*120] clearly drawn." n242 Although this very likely would not happen in the sophisticated commercial banking world, if a "Belgian chocolate" lender somehow did not know the risk for which it was getting the high rate, the lender should still be liable because it gained financially (though without knowledge) from the infringement. Placing responsibility for the loss on such a lender has the benefit of creating a greater incentive for the lender to police its lending operations carefully to avoid unnecessary losses to others.
b ผลประโยชน์ทางการเงินของผู้ให้กู้ "ช็อกโกแลตเบลเยียม" The plain vanilla lender who charges within what might be considered a standard range for interest rates and fees might be different from what might be termed a "Belgian chocolate" lender. Such a lender is one who charges a premium rate of interest and/or fees beyond the standard range. In such a case, the lender's unusually high interest rate or fees might directly arise from the fact of higher risk associated with on-going or potential infringement. This would raise the red flag of financial benefit, as the rate and/or fees are tied to infringement. Though the above average interest rate might not change with the level of infringement, it arises because of it, and is therefore problematic. A critic might say this reads some knowledge into vicarious liability. While, as noted above, knowledge of infringement is not a requirement of vicarious liability, n239 it can be considered in the analysis. The Supreme Court in 2005reiterated in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. n240 an idea it had previously explained two decades earlier in Sony n241: "the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not [*120] clearly drawn." n242 Although this very likely would not happen in the sophisticated commercial banking world, if a "Belgian chocolate" lender somehow did not know the risk for which it was getting the high rate, the lender should still be liable because it gained financially (though without knowledge) from the infringement. Placing responsibility for the loss on such a lender has the benefit of creating a greater incentive for the lender to police its lending operations carefully to avoid unnecessary losses to others.
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