In the process of giving the concept of patron-clientage universal relevance, it has been rendered analytically sterile. First, it makes it impossible to distinguish patron-client relations from other social relations, and second, one is no longer able to identify specifically political relations between unequals, as all asymmetrical relations are conceptualized as relations of patron-clientage. It has been argued that only a fairly circumscribed set of relations warrants the label of 'patron-client relationship' (Kemp 1982; 1984). Since by definition all relations, except those in a peer group, are hierarchical in Thai society, to denote them all as patron-client relations is both imprecise and pointless. Constructively, Kemp recommends viewing social relations as on a 'continuum of personalism' (1984:63) with intimate kinship relations at end and relations of marked power at the other. The patron-client relation occupies ground midway between these two extremes and is marked by the fact that its particularism 'disguises or moderates the harsh facts of its objective inequalities' (ibid.:65). Other analysts have seized on Kemp's criticisms; but patron-client relation' 4 ln this study, I reserve use of the term 'patron-client relation' to dyadic, multifaceted and asymmetrical relation where there is an evident ongoing personal and reciprocal element to the relationship. Patron-client relations of this kind have become scarcer as capital rather than followers has become the primary source of pawer, and , conversely , as the majority of rural people rely on the marker to sustain a livelihood rather than in other people who have more resources.