7. ConclusionOur approachinthisrevi

7. Conclusion
Our approachinthisreviewistodefineearningsqualitybroadlytobedecisionusefulness—in anydecisionbyany
decision maker.Thusthenumberofrelevantarticlesisover300,andbynecessityourdiscussionisbroad.
We emphasizetwosignificantconclusionsbasedonoursurveyoftheearningsqualityliteratureasawhole.First,
because alloftheproxiesforearningsqualitythatinvolveearnings(i.e.,propertiessuchaspersistence,timelyloss
recognition, smoothness,andsmallprofits,aswellastheERCs)haveattheircorethereportedaccrual-basedearnings
number, theseproxiesareaffectedbothbythefirm’sfundamentalperformanceandbythemeasurementofperformance.
Future researchcouldmoreclearlyrecognizethedistinctionbetweenperformanceandperformancemeasurementwhen
making predictionsandevaluatingresults.Thiswouldhelpusasaprofessiontodeterminethecontributionofthe
accounting measurementsystemtothequalityofreportedearnings.
Second, althoughalloftheproxiesbasedonreportedearningsareaffectedbybothfundamentalperformanceandits
measurement, theproxiesarenotequallyaffectedbythesetwofactors.Therefore,theproxiesdonotmeasurethesame
underlying construct.Inaddition,becausetheproxiesfocusondifferentelementsofdecisionusefulness,weshouldnot
expect theproxiestoworkequallywellinallcircumstancesinvestigatedbyresearchers.Wehopethebreadthofthe
discussion ofeachproxyhasshedlightonthecontext-specificdimensionsofqualitycapturedbyeachproxyandonthe
sometimes subtledistinctionsbetweenthem.
As partofourreviewprocess,wenotedfiveareasofresearchthathavereceivedrelativelylittleattention;webelieve
that furtherresearchonthesetopicswouldsubstantiallyenhanceourunderstandingofearningsquality.
(1)Whenmakingchoicesthataffectreportedearnings,amanager’sobjectivefunctioncanincludemultiple,andperhaps
competing,objectives.Theseobjectivescouldrelatetocompensationordebtcontractprovisions,litigationrisk,proprietary
costs,orincentivestoinfluencestockprice,tonameafew.Therearetwonoteworthyfeaturesofthemanager’sdecision
problem.First,managersareconstrainedtoreportonlyoneearningsnumber,buttheexistenceofmultipleobjectivesmay
require trade-offs.Second,managerschoosea set (or portfolio)ofaccountingchoices,notjustone,thatdeterminesearnings,
whichsuggeststhattheymighthavetheflexibilitytotailorindividualelementsofthesettodifferentobjectives.89 Two
interestingpathsforfutureresearchare(i)toexaminehowmanagerschoosebetweencompetingobjectivesand(ii)to
examinechoicesabouttheportfolioofaccountingchoices,specificallywithinthecontextofmeetingmultipleobjectives.
The existingliteratureincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminecompetingmultipleincentives(mostcommonly
financial reporting,taxandregulatoryobjectivesforfinancialinstitutions),butthesestudiestypicallyexaminea single
accounting choice (e.g., loanlossprovisions).Theliteraturealsoincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminemultiple
accounting choicestoachievea single objective (e.g., usingrealearningsmanagementversusdiscretionaryaccruals),but
studies ofthistypearerelativelylimited.Theliteratureincludesalmostnoevidenceonwhetherfirmsoptimizeoveraset
of accountingchoicestomeetmultipleobjectives,despitevariationintheabilityofspecificaccountingchoicestomeet
specific objectives.90 All typesofaccrualchoices,forexample,mayenableafirmtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation,butthey
might differintheirtransparencytoequitymarkets,andhenceintheirimpactonequityvaluationdecisions.
Theorypapershaveexaminedtheimpactofmultipleincentivesonaccountingchoice(e.g., Demski,1973;Evansand
Sridhar,1996;Liang,2004;Chenetal.,2007) andanalyzedtheeffectofvariationsinoptimalcontracts(SridharandMagee,
1996). Thesemodels,however,aregenerallyconcernedwiththeimplicationsofmultipleobjectivesonasingleaccounting
choice;theydonotaddresstheissueofthefirmmakingaportfolioofaccountingchoicesthatintheaggregateaffect
earnings. Christensenetal.(2005) specificallyrecognizethepotentialforaninteractionbetweencompetingincentivesand
individualaccountingchoices: ‘‘Increasingthepersistentcomponentsandreducingthereversiblecomponentsaregenerally
desirableforvaluation,butnotforcontracting.Eliminatingtransitorycomponentsofearningsisgenerallydesirableforvaluation,
butnotnecessarilyforcontracting.’’(p.265) KirschenheiterandMelumad(2002) makearelatedpoint.Assuminganobjective
of equityvaluemaximization,theyshowthatthenatureofthemanager’sprivateinformationaboutcashflows(‘‘good’’news
or ‘‘bad’’news)determineswhethertheoutcomeofheraccountingchoiceswillbesmootherearningsorbigbaths.Thisresult
hasimplicationsforunconditionallyinterpretingsmoothnessasaproxyforearningsmanagement.
Researchers alsocanthinkabout‘‘multiple’’incentivesaschangesinincentivesthroughtime.Domanagerstradeoffthe
immediate benefitsofopportunisticaccountingchoicesatthetimeofaneventsuchasanIPOorSEOagainstthepotential
long-term reputationlossduetotheseone-offearningsmanagementdecisions?

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 2:

7.
สรุปของเราapproachinthisreviewistodefineearningsqualitybroadlytobedecisionusefulness ใน anydecisionbyany
ตัดสินใจ maker.Thusthenumberofrelevantarticlesisover300, andbynecessityourdiscussionisbroad.
เรา เรียบเนียน andsmallprofits, aswellastheERCs) haveattheircorethereportedaccrual-basedearnings จำนวน theseproxiesareaffectedbothbythefirm'sfundamentalperformanceandbythemeasurementofperformance. ในอนาคต researchcouldmoreclearlyrecognizethedistinctionbetweenperformanceandperformancemeasurementwhen ทำ measurementsystemtothequalityofreportedearnings. ประการที่สอง theproxiesarenotequallyaffectedbythesetwofactors.Therefore, theproxiesdonotmeasurethesame พื้นฐาน construct.Inaddition, becausetheproxiesfocusondifferentelementsofdecisionusefulness, weshouldnot คาดหวัง ofeachproxyhasshedlightonthecontext-specificdimensionsofqualitycapturedbyeachproxyandonthe บางครั้ง subtledistinctionsbetweenthem. ในฐานะที่เป็น การค้า offs.Second ชุด managerschoosea (หรือ รายงาน taxandregulatoryobjectivesforfinancialinstitutions) butthesestudiestypicallyexaminea เดียวกับทางเลือกการบัญชี(เช่น loanlossprovisions) .Theliteraturealsoincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminemultiple choicestoachievea บัญชีวัตถุประสงค์เดียว (เช่น usingrealearningsmanagementversusdiscretionaryaccruals) แต่การศึกษาofthistypearerelativelylimited.Theliteratureincludesalmostnoevidenceonwhetherfirmsoptimizeoveraset ของ objectives.90 typesofaccrualchoices ทั้งหมดตามตัวอย่าง mayenableafirmtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation, butthey อาจ Demski 1973; Evansand Sridhar 1996; เหลียง, 2004. Chenetal 2007) andanalyzedtheeffectofvariationsinoptimalcontracts (SridharandMagee, 1996) Christensenetal. (2005) KirschenheiterandMelumad (2002) makearelatedpoint.Assuminganobjective ของ reputationlossduetotheseone-offearningsmanagementdecisions?

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 3:

7 . สรุป approachinthisreviewistodefineearningsqualitybroadlytobedecisionusefulness ของเราในการตัดสินใจ anydecisionbyany เครื่อง

thusthenumberofrelevantarticlesisover300 andbynecessityourdiscussionisbroad , .

เพราะเรา emphasizetwosignificantconclusionsbasedonoursurveyoftheearningsqualityliteratureasawhole ครั้งแรก ( เช่น propertiessuchaspersistence alloftheproxiesforearningsqualitythatinvolveearnings ,timelyloss
รับรู้ ความเรียบเนียน andsmallprofits aswellastheercs ) , haveattheircorethereportedaccrual basedearnings
หมายเลข theseproxiesareaffectedbothbythefirm'sfundamentalperformanceandbythemeasurementofperformance .

ทำให้อนาคต researchcouldmoreclearlyrecognizethedistinctionbetweenperformanceandperformancemeasurementwhen predictionsandevaluatingresults .measurementsystemtothequalityofreportedearnings บัญชี thiswouldhelpusasaprofessiontodeterminethecontributionofthe
.
2 althoughalloftheproxiesbasedonreportedearningsareaffectedbybothfundamentalperformanceandits
วัด theproxiesarenotequallyaffectedbythesetwofactors ดังนั้น theproxiesdonotmeasurethesame
ต้นแบบและสร้าง .becausetheproxiesfocusondifferentelementsofdecisionusefulness weshouldnot
คาดหวัง , theproxiestoworkequallywellinallcircumstancesinvestigatedbyresearchers . wehopethebreadthofthe

บางครั้งการสนทนา ofeachproxyhasshedlightonthecontext specificdimensionsofqualitycapturedbyeachproxyandonthe subtledistinctionsbetweenthem เป็น partofourreviewprocess .
,wenotedfiveareasofresearchthathavereceivedrelativelylittleattention ; webelieve ที่ furtherresearchonthesetopicswouldsubstantiallyenhanceourunderstandingofearningsquality
.
( 1 ) whenmakingchoicesthataffectreportedearnings amanager'sobjectivefunctioncanincludemultiple andperhaps
, , แข่งขัน , วัตถุประสงค์ theseobjectivescouldrelatetocompensationordebtcontractprovisions litigationrisk , ค่าใช้จ่ายส่วนตัว ,
,orincentivestoinfluencestockprice tonameafew , ปัญหา therearetwonoteworthyfeaturesofthemanager'sdecision

managersareconstrainedtoreportonlyoneearningsnumber แรก buttheexistenceofmultipleobjectivesmay
ต้อง trade-offs วินาที managerschoosea ชุด ( หรือเอกสาร ) ofaccountingchoices notjustone thatdeterminesearnings
, , ,whichsuggeststhattheymighthavetheflexibilitytotailorindividualelementsofthesettodifferentobjectives.89 สอง
interestingpathsforfutureresearchare ( ฉัน ) toexaminehowmanagerschoosebetweencompetingobjectivesand ( 2 ) examinechoicesabouttheportfolioofaccountingchoices

,
specificallywithinthecontextofmeetingmultipleobjectives .การ existingliteratureincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminecompetingmultipleincentives ( mostcommonly
การรายงานทางการเงิน taxandregulatoryobjectivesforfinancialinstitutions ) butthesestudiestypicallyexaminea เดียว
บัญชีทางเลือก ( เช่น loanlossprovisions ) theliteraturealsoincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminemultiple
choicestoachievea มีบัญชีเดียว ( เช่นusingrealearningsmanagementversusdiscretionaryaccruals ) แต่

ของการศึกษา ofthistypearerelativelylimited . theliteratureincludesalmostnoevidenceonwhetherfirmsoptimizeoveraset accountingchoicestomeetmultipleobjectives despitevariationintheabilityofspecificaccountingchoicestomeet
, เฉพาะ objectives.90 ทั้งหมด typesofaccrualchoices คือ mayenableafirmtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation มาก
, ,