There are useful distinctions in some ways and, as we will see shortly, they further provide political scientists with a method and model to distinguish between developing and developed nations. However, to anticipate the criticisms that were later made, in reality most societies (even the United States) are complex mixtures and overlaps of ascription and merit, of particularism and universalism, of functional diffuseness and functional specificity. Nor in the Parsons formulation is there any indication of how societies move from or stage to another. Is it culture and changing values that drive the change; is it economic development and industrialization; something else? Do we learn why these three pattern variables are singled out and not others (Parsons actually changed his mind on the issue a couple of times, sometime including other pattern variables)? In addition, the dichotomous, either-or categories of traditional and modern are too absolute; they tell us little about the mixed or hybrid cases (most countries in the world) that lie in-between these two polarized ideal types; and, therefore, they probably present a false picture of both traditional and modern societies. Plus, if a modern society is defined by the three traits Parsons ascribes to it, it is likely that no developing country can ever achieve that position, a disappointment that is likely to lead to frustration and mass discontent. The pattern variables seem almost antiseptic: is there any room in them for clash and conflict, conflict, coups d’etat, revolutions, exploitation, civil war, genocide, AIDS, and other realities of the poorer nations? One will not find an answer in Parsons ‘pattern variables.