vigorously oversee Complex Asset Team decisions on how to administer
assets.
2
Pre-seizure planning is designed to identify potential obstacles in the
asset forfeiture process that may expose the government to unnecessary
risk, such as seizing assets with limited equity and becoming involved in
protracted litigation with third-parties who may have larger interests in the
assets. As such, pre-seizure planningis necessary to help the USMS and
other DOJ Asset Forfeiture Program partners guide complex assets, such as
operating businesses, through the forfeiture process. Our audit determined
that because the Complex Asset Team has not instituted consistent preseizure planning procedures, the government has assumed responsibility for
assets with significant liabilities that constrain the ability of the government
to dispose of these assets.
Our audit found that the Complex Asset Team did not consistently
track and document how assets it was responsible for were managed,
appraised, and disposed. The Complex Asset Team provided us a list of 55
assets it disposed of between 2005 and 2010. The final values listed for
each asset ranged from $1 to $49 million. Our review of this list revealed at
least eight assets for which the ultimate purchaser or the final sale price was
not recorded. Further, of the 55 disposed complex assets listed, we were
able to locate corresponding files for only 47 of the assets. Additionally, our
file review identified files related to35 additional assets that were not
detailed on a Complex Asset Teaminventory of all assets.
Further, we found the Complex Asset Team also lacked procedures to
ensure that team members charged with valuing an asset were prevented
from also selling the same asset. In multiple instances,Briskman valued
and sold the same asset himself, without sufficient supervisory oversight or
review by other team members. Additionally, in an effort to simplify the
asset disposal process, Briskman did not publicly announce the sale of some
complex assets, which we found limited the ability of the general public to
purchase assets. Briskman also made these decisions without sufficient
oversight by his supervisor. This lack of transparent procedures an
vigorously oversee Complex Asset Team decisions on how to administer assets.2 Pre-seizure planning is designed to identify potential obstacles in the asset forfeiture process that may expose the government to unnecessary risk, such as seizing assets with limited equity and becoming involved in protracted litigation with third-parties who may have larger interests in the assets. As such, pre-seizure planningis necessary to help the USMS and other DOJ Asset Forfeiture Program partners guide complex assets, such as operating businesses, through the forfeiture process. Our audit determined that because the Complex Asset Team has not instituted consistent preseizure planning procedures, the government has assumed responsibility for assets with significant liabilities that constrain the ability of the government to dispose of these assets. Our audit found that the Complex Asset Team did not consistently track and document how assets it was responsible for were managed, appraised, and disposed. The Complex Asset Team provided us a list of 55 assets it disposed of between 2005 and 2010. The final values listed for each asset ranged from $1 to $49 million. Our review of this list revealed at least eight assets for which the ultimate purchaser or the final sale price was not recorded. Further, of the 55 disposed complex assets listed, we were able to locate corresponding files for only 47 of the assets. Additionally, our file review identified files related to35 additional assets that were not detailed on a Complex Asset Teaminventory of all assets. Further, we found the Complex Asset Team also lacked procedures to ensure that team members charged with valuing an asset were prevented from also selling the same asset. In multiple instances,Briskman valued and sold the same asset himself, without sufficient supervisory oversight or review by other team members. Additionally, in an effort to simplify the asset disposal process, Briskman did not publicly announce the sale of some complex assets, which we found limited the ability of the general public to purchase assets. Briskman also made these decisions without sufficient oversight by his supervisor. This lack of transparent procedures an
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