The debate about which Western ethical theory is most
suited to understand Buddhist ethics has been fruitful,
because it places the Buddhist tradition in a light that
brings out new features. In this article I take further
Keown’s view on Buddhist ethics by offering a virtue
ethical interpretation of Buddhist ethics with praxis/
practice as a central notion, and a form of naturalism as
foundation. I draw on the notion of play, as developed by
Gadamer and Wittgenstein, and on MacIntyre’s view on
virtues as grounded in practices, narratives, and
traditions, as widening hermeneutical circles. I conclude
by arguing that such an interpretation is a fruitful one,
both in the sense that it increases our understanding and
that it motivates to engage in Buddhist practice.
The debate about which Western ethical theory is mostsuited to understand Buddhist ethics has been fruitful,because it places the Buddhist tradition in a light thatbrings out new features. In this article I take furtherKeown’s view on Buddhist ethics by offering a virtueethical interpretation of Buddhist ethics with praxis/practice as a central notion, and a form of naturalism asfoundation. I draw on the notion of play, as developed byGadamer and Wittgenstein, and on MacIntyre’s view onvirtues as grounded in practices, narratives, andtraditions, as widening hermeneutical circles. I concludeby arguing that such an interpretation is a fruitful one,both in the sense that it increases our understanding andthat it motivates to engage in Buddhist practice.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
