Analysis of the magnitude, rather than likelihood of LTIP use
yields similar evidence in support of hypotheses 2b and 4b.
The findings, based on the multiple regression analysis
shown in Table 4, provide statistically significant support for
H2b: For two of the four measures (combined CEO and
chair positions and CEO tenure), the greater the CEO's
influence, the smaller the average size of LTIP grants
following adoption. Only one of the four CEO influence
variables used, the commonly used ratio of inside to outside directors, was unrelated to both LTIP adoption and use.
Overall, the set of significant findings with respect to H1,
H2a, and H2b is quite consistent with the argument that
powerful CEOs are able to influence boards of directors to
adopt, but not to use long-term incentive plans.
Analysis of the magnitude, rather than likelihood of LTIP useyields similar evidence in support of hypotheses 2b and 4b.The findings, based on the multiple regression analysisshown in Table 4, provide statistically significant support forH2b: For two of the four measures (combined CEO andchair positions and CEO tenure), the greater the CEO'sinfluence, the smaller the average size of LTIP grantsfollowing adoption. Only one of the four CEO influencevariables used, the commonly used ratio of inside to outside directors, was unrelated to both LTIP adoption and use.Overall, the set of significant findings with respect to H1,H2a, and H2b is quite consistent with the argument thatpowerful CEOs are able to influence boards of directors toadopt, but not to use long-term incentive plans.
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