Defending the peso in the face of large capital outflows was draining the reserves of Mexico’s central bank.
(August 17, 1994 was the date of the presidential election.)
Ask your students if they can figure out why Mexico’s central bank didn’t tell anybody it was running out of reserves.
The answer: If people had known that the reserves were dwindling, then they would also have known that the central bank would soon have to devalue or abandon the fixed exchange rate altogether. They would have expected the peso to fall, which would have caused a further increase in Mexico’s risk premium, which would have put even more downward pressure on Mexico’s exchange rate and made it even harder for the central bank to “defend the peso.”
Source (not only for the data on this slide, but some of the other information in this case study): Washington Post National Weekly Edition, pp8‑9, Feb 20‑26 1995, various issues of The Economist in Jan & Feb '95.
Defending the peso in the face of large capital outflows was draining the reserves of Mexico’s central bank. (August 17, 1994 was the date of the presidential election.) Ask your students if they can figure out why Mexico’s central bank didn’t tell anybody it was running out of reserves. The answer: If people had known that the reserves were dwindling, then they would also have known that the central bank would soon have to devalue or abandon the fixed exchange rate altogether. They would have expected the peso to fall, which would have caused a further increase in Mexico’s risk premium, which would have put even more downward pressure on Mexico’s exchange rate and made it even harder for the central bank to “defend the peso.” Source (not only for the data on this slide, but some of the other information in this case study): Washington Post National Weekly Edition, pp8‑9, Feb 20‑26 1995, various issues of The Economist in Jan & Feb '95.
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