This suggests a fourth lesson from the Asian crisis: the need for a more formal mechanism
for international private debt workouts for emerging economies that ultimately relies more on
private funds than IMF bailouts. There are two parallel frameworks from which such a
mechanism could draw: domestic bankruptcy proceedings in the industrialized countries, and
international workout mechanisms for developing country sovereign debt. Each creates a
negotiating framework for debtors and creditors that helps to overcome some of the collective
action problems that characterize financial crises. Bankruptcy proceedings have several key
components, including (1) a standstill on debt servicing, legitimized by an independent arbitrator
(the court); (2) a mechanism for drawing new interim private sector financing; and (3) a system
for debt reduction, debt rescheduling, and/or debt-equity conversions. Sovereign debt workout mechanisms have developed many of the same characteristics in the years following the
developing country debt crisis of the 1980s. Debt standstills emerged, often in an ad-hoc manner,
but in most cases ultimately with the implicit approval of an arbitrator (in this case, the IMF). The
borrower negotiated with creditor committees (either the Paris or London Club) to refinance or
reschedule loans, and occasionally for a debt-equity swap. Interim financing was made available
either from official sources (the IMF, the World Bank, or industrialized country governments) or
from commercial banks as part of Brady Plan workouts. Importantly, in the end, restructuring
under the auspices of the Paris Club or via Brady bonds involved a significant debt reductions.
This suggests a fourth lesson from the Asian crisis: the need for a more formal mechanismfor international private debt workouts for emerging economies that ultimately relies more onprivate funds than IMF bailouts. There are two parallel frameworks from which such amechanism could draw: domestic bankruptcy proceedings in the industrialized countries, andinternational workout mechanisms for developing country sovereign debt. Each creates anegotiating framework for debtors and creditors that helps to overcome some of the collectiveaction problems that characterize financial crises. Bankruptcy proceedings have several keycomponents, including (1) a standstill on debt servicing, legitimized by an independent arbitrator(the court); (2) a mechanism for drawing new interim private sector financing; and (3) a systemfor debt reduction, debt rescheduling, and/or debt-equity conversions. Sovereign debt workout mechanisms have developed many of the same characteristics in the years following thedeveloping country debt crisis of the 1980s. Debt standstills emerged, often in an ad-hoc manner,but in most cases ultimately with the implicit approval of an arbitrator (in this case, the IMF). Theborrower negotiated with creditor committees (either the Paris or London Club) to refinance orreschedule loans, and occasionally for a debt-equity swap. Interim financing was made availableeither from official sources (the IMF, the World Bank, or industrialized country governments) orfrom commercial banks as part of Brady Plan workouts. Importantly, in the end, restructuring
under the auspices of the Paris Club or via Brady bonds involved a significant debt reductions.
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