As John Gray indicates, Wittgenstein's analysis of rules and rule-
following undermines the kind of liberal reasoning that envisages the
common framework for argumentation on the model of a 'neutral' or
'rational' dialogue. According to a Wittgensteinian perspective:
'Whatever there is of definite content in contractarian deliberation and
its deliverance, derives from particular judgments we are inclined to
make as practitioners of specific forms of life. The forms of life in
which we find ourselves are themselves held together by a network of
precontractual agreements, without which there would be no
possibility of mutual understanding or therefore, of disagreement.'
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Such an approach offers a fruitful alternative to rationalist liberalism
because it can be developed in a way that highlights the historical and
contingent character of the discourses that construct our identities.
This is exemplified by Richard Flathman when he notes that,
notwithstanding the fact that a good deal of agreement has been
achieved on many features of liberal democratic politics, certainty is
not to be seen as necessary in any of the philosophical senses. In his
view, 'Our agreement in these judgments constitutes the language of
our politics. It is a language arrived at and continuously modified
through no less than a history of discourse, a history in which we have
thought about, as we became able to think in, that language/
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