CONCLUSIONS
Viewed from the early twenty-first century, the fate of nationalism in the new
nation-states of Southeast Asia no longer appears—even retrospectively—as
uncertain as described by Geertz in his landmark essays of 1973. With the
benefit of hindsight, the tensions between “essentialism” and “epochalism”
and the conflicts between “primordial sentiments” and “civil politics” once
identified and emphasized by Geertz no longer seem to have been so crucial
to the varying fates of nationalism across the region. Nor do the diverging trajectories of nationalism in post-independence Southeast Asia appear explicable
in terms of constellations of ethnic diversity and their variously enabling or
impeding impact on the imperative of national integration. Apparently improbable
new nation-states—Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos—have seemingly settled
quite comfortably into nationhood over the years, with little remaining fear
of dissolution. Even in Burma, ethnic separatist movements remain weak,
with the military regime exercising more effective national sovereignty over
its territory today than ever before. For better and for worse (just ask around
in Pattani or West Papua, Mae Sot or Maguindanao), the fate of various nationalisms
across Southeast Asia now appear to be firmly fixed. East Timor’s independence
is the sole exception that proves this impressively un-falsified
Andersonian rule.