In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. This original position is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to to a certain conception of justice. Among the essential ieatures of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favour his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement bargain. For given the circumstances of the original position, the symmetry o everyone's relations to each other, this initial situation is fair between individual moral persons, that is, as rational beings with their own ends and capable. I sha assume, of a sense of justice. The original position is, one might say, th appropriate initial status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. This explains the propriety of the name'justice as fairness' it conveys