Two interesting literatures have arisen examining this procedural relationship between president and Congress and how the behavior of each affects not only the political fortunes of the other but the nature of U.S. foreign policy as well. The first centers on the conditions on the conditions under which presidents will assert their authority and use foreign policy to counter vulnerability or low standing domestically. The second focuses on the role of Congress in framing the foreign policy agenda for presidents.
Some have called presidents use of foreign policy as a means to deal with problems domestically the “gamble for resurrection in the voters” (Downs and Rocke 1994; Smith 1996). And the literature has reported a diversionary use of force internationally in response to a decline in public approval at home. This reaction has been described in terms of “policy availability” The use of foreign policy as a substitute when other avenues are closed to the president. Consider Brule’s (2008) study examining relations between the president and Congress in decisions to use force. He argues that an uncooperative Congress can compel “the president to look beyond the domestic arena for opportunities to demonstrate his competence” (Brule 2008: 353). At such times, a president turns to foreign policy—that place where constitutionally he has a greater capacity to act without congressional approval. Brule contends, and finds, that president do.