Weak Social and Political Institutions
Natural resources are neither a blessing nor a curse; intrinsically they can neither
positively nor negatively affect political and economic developments. Rather, the
negative effects of natural resources are correlated with a country’s “structured
contingency.” According to Terry Karl, “prior interactions of structure and agency
Politics of Natural Resource Use 125
create the institutional legacy that constrains choice down the road.”2 In other
words, when revenues from a commodity (e.g., oil) are inserted into an existing
political configuration, this configuration will shape how the revenue will be
used to influence political and economic outcomes.3 Despite a constitutionally
mandated democratic system, power in Cambodia is firmly in the hands of the
executive branch. The government is built on patrimonialism, whereby a leader’s
power comes from his ability to capture and maintain the loyalty of key sections
of the politico-commercial elite by fulfilling their material aspirations through
the distribution of perquisites.4 Since the 1998 elections, Hun Sen has served as
sole prime minister and has been labeled Cambodia’s “strongman.” In fact, he
has served as prime minister of Cambodia since 1984. However, as Sorpong Poeu
explains,
the Prime Minister’s political survival continues to depend on the goodwill of other
CPP officials and military leaders who have also reaped the benefits from the CPP’s
political hegemony. Those who have benefited from Hun Sen’s grip on power are
those who have helped to keep him in power.5
This power is structured as interlocking patron-client networks, serving as a
means of exclusion and inclusion in a multinetwork competition resulting in the
misallocation of government resources, corruption, and unresponsive government
institutions. A well-functioning state requires effective oversight mechanisms,
such as the National Assembly, the judiciary, the National Audit Authority, and
public financial management. Institutions with appropriate authority can hold
elected officials and other government institutions accountable for their actions.
Contrary to constitutional stipulations, the Cambodian National Assembly lacks
the capacity—political will, capital, and human resources—to exercise its legislative
and oversight power.6